Smith v. State
1998 WL 117860, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 38, 965 S.W.2d 509 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The 'provoking the difficulty' doctrine, which limits a defendant's right to self-defense, requires a jury instruction when there is sufficient evidence that the defendant's acts or words provoked an attack, those acts or words were reasonably calculated to provoke the attack, and they were done with the intent to create a pretext for inflicting harm.
Facts:
- On April 1, 1994, the appellant, Smith, and his girlfriend Marcia Montgomery, met the victim, Charlie Taylor, along with Susan Phillips and John Prader, at the Character Club.
- Later, Smith, Montgomery, Taylor, Phillips, Prader, and Sadie Fuselier ended up at Taylor's apartment, drinking beer and some reportedly smoking crack cocaine.
- An argument began between Smith and Fuselier, which then escalated into an argument between Smith and Taylor.
- Fuselier testified that she saw Taylor take a knife from his pocket, place it on a counter, and return to his position, without threatening Smith.
- Fuselier testified that Smith picked up the knife, walked over to Taylor, and stabbed him multiple times, saying, “I’ll stab you, I’ll kill you,” and after Taylor fell, “I’ll stab you again.”
- Montgomery and Smith testified that Taylor became verbally abusive, pushed Smith, pulled a knife from his back pocket, and lunged at Smith, leading to a struggle.
- Smith testified that he "cut" Taylor again when Taylor started to approach him after the initial struggle, stating he was trying to keep Taylor off him.
- Taylor died from two stab wounds that penetrated his heart and liver.
Procedural Posture:
- Smith was indicted for murder.
- A jury convicted Smith of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment.
- The trial court, over Smith’s objection, included an instruction on the law of provocation in its charge to the jury on self-defense.
- The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction.
- Smith filed a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, arguing the Court of Appeals erred in holding there was evidence of provocation.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence exist from which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant provoked an attack with the intent to create a pretext for inflicting harm, thereby warranting an instruction on the 'provoking the difficulty' doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Womack, Judge
Yes, sufficient evidence existed to warrant a jury instruction on the 'provoking the difficulty' doctrine, because a rational jury could find that Smith's actions and words were intended to and reasonably calculated to provoke an attack from the victim, thereby limiting his self-defense claim. The court clarified the doctrine, stating that a provocation instruction is required when there is sufficient evidence that (1) the defendant did some act or used some words which provoked the attack on him, (2) such act or words were reasonably calculated to provoke the attack, and (3) the act was done or the words were used for the purpose and with the intent that the defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm upon the other. The court emphasized that all three elements are questions of fact for the jury and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Reviewing the facts, the court found sufficient evidence: Smith's loud argument with Fuselier late at night in Taylor's home caused Taylor to intervene and warn Smith; Smith did not stop, and Taylor then attacked. Smith himself admitted his exchanges with Fuselier caused the 'whole thing.' The court further clarified that prior opinions like Stanley v. State and Williamson v. State were wrongly decided for improperly applying the law to the facts and encroaching on the jury's fact-finding province. Circumstantial evidence, such as Smith's agitation over being left at the club, arguments about a crack pipe, continued provocation after warnings, and multiple stab wounds, could lead a rational jury to infer the requisite intent.
Dissenting - Baird, Judge
No, the evidence was insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the 'provoking the difficulty' doctrine because there was no evidence that Smith intended to provoke the deceased to act in such a way as to provide a pretext for killing him. Judge Baird agreed with the Court of Appeals that the first two elements of provocation (self-defense is an issue, deceased made the first attack) were raised by the testimony, but disagreed that the third element (defendant acted or spoke with intent and reasonable calculation to provoke to have a pretext for injury) was met. The dissent argued that the record was "devoid of any evidence" that Smith's argument with Fuselier, assuming it occurred, was intended to provoke Taylor to provide a pretext for killing him, or that Smith had any desire to kill Taylor. Citing Williamson and Jones, the dissent asserted that the court cannot speculate on intent and that evidence of an argument alone is insufficient to suggest intent to provoke. Judge Baird criticized the majority for re-writing the law on provocation and for overruling Stanley v. State, holding to a firm respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and arguably expands the 'provoking the difficulty' doctrine in Texas by providing a more defined three-part test and emphasizing the jury's role in determining all elements, including intent, often through circumstantial evidence. By re-evaluating and limiting prior precedents such as Stanley and Williamson, the court has made it easier for the State to introduce a provocation instruction, thereby limiting a defendant's self-defense claim. This ruling suggests that even indirect actions or words, when coupled with surrounding circumstances, can be sufficient for a jury to infer a calculated intent to provoke, shifting the focus more towards the defendant's overall conduct and state of mind rather than requiring direct evidence of specific provocative words or actions.
