Smith v. State
286 S.W.3d 333 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
To obtain a hearing on a motion for a new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must allege facts in a supporting affidavit that show reasonable grounds to believe they could prevail on both prongs of the Strickland test, including a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's alleged errors.
Facts:
- David Smith was placed on ten years' deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to sexual assault in 1998.
- Eight years later, in 2006, the State alleged Smith violated his supervision by failing to report, failing to attend counseling, and committing deadly conduct and a terroristic threat against Jonathan Holt.
- The deadly conduct and terroristic threat allegations stemmed from an incident where Smith pointed a gun at Holt.
- During this incident, Smith shot all four tires of Holt's vehicle.
- Smith's daughter later testified that Smith pointed a gun at Holt, but that no one was inside the vehicle when her father shot the tires.
- Smith claimed his failure to report for supervision was due to hospitalization following spinal surgery, for which he was taking prescription medication.
Procedural Posture:
- David Smith (appellant) was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision by a trial court.
- The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging community supervision violations.
- Following a hearing, the trial court found three violations to be true, adjudicated Smith guilty of the original offense, and sentenced him to twenty years in prison.
- Smith filed a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court denied without holding a hearing.
- Smith, as appellant, appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court), arguing the trial court erred by not holding a hearing.
- The Court of Appeals found the trial court abused its discretion, reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for a hearing.
- The State, as petitioner, was granted a petition for discretionary review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the state's highest court for criminal matters).
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Issue:
Does a defendant seeking a hearing on a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel have to allege facts showing a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different to establish 'reasonable grounds' for relief?
Opinions:
Majority - Price, J.
Yes, to be entitled to a hearing on a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege facts showing reasonable grounds that they could prevail on both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of the Strickland v. Washington test. A hearing is not an absolute right and is only required for matters not determinable from the record where the movant establishes 'reasonable grounds' for relief. For an ineffective assistance claim, this means alleging facts that, if true, would show not only that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Here, Smith failed to meet the prejudice prong because the trial court found three separate violations of his community supervision, and only one is required for revocation. Smith's proposed testimony and medical records might have challenged the 'failure to report' violation, but they did not negate the other two violations for deadly conduct and terroristic threat. Even under Smith's version of the facts, his conduct of shooting a gun near other people and shooting out the tires to prevent Holt from leaving still constituted these offenses. Therefore, Smith failed to allege facts showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the hearing.
Dissenting - Meyers, J.
No, the Strickland prejudice standard is an unworkable and insurmountable barrier for defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in non-capital sentencing proceedings, and therefore should not be the basis for denying a hearing. The dissent argues that it is nearly impossible for a defendant to prove that their sentence would have been different but for counsel's errors, as long as the sentence falls within the statutory range. By requiring such a showing just to get a hearing, the majority perpetuates a standard that effectively denies defendants relief for substandard representation at the punishment phase. The dissent criticizes the majority author for adopting a standard he had previously opposed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the pleading standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in Texas. The court's holding raises the threshold by requiring the defendant to allege specific facts supporting both the deficiency and, critically, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the initial motion. This makes it more difficult for defendants to secure a hearing to develop their claims, as they must forecast from the outset how the outcome would have changed, potentially preventing 'fishing expeditions' but also limiting opportunities to build a record for appeal on claims that require evidence outside the trial record.
