Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
53 L. Ed. 2d 14, 431 U.S. 816, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 108 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A state's procedures for removing a foster child from a foster home satisfy the Due Process Clause if they provide for adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, such as an administrative conference and judicial review, even if they do not provide a mandatory, automatic judicial hearing prior to every removal.
Facts:
- New York State operates a foster care system where children are placed in the temporary care of foster families either through voluntary placement agreements signed by natural parents or through court orders.
- The stated policy of the New York system is that foster care is a temporary arrangement, with the ultimate goal being to reunite the child with their natural parents or to facilitate adoption.
- Foster parents are licensed and compensated by the state, and they provide care under contractual arrangements with an authorized child welfare agency.
- These contracts typically reserve the right of the agency to remove the child from the foster home at its discretion.
- The appellees, a group of foster parents, had cared for children for over a year and developed deep emotional bonds, forming what they described as a 'psychological family.'
- State and city officials determined that it was in the best interest of these children to be removed from their foster homes, either for transfer to another foster home or to be returned to their natural parents.
Procedural Posture:
- Individual foster parents and an organization of foster parents filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The suit was brought against New York State and New York City officials, alleging that the state's procedures for removing foster children from foster homes violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- A group of natural mothers was granted leave to intervene in support of the defendant officials.
- A divided three-judge District Court held that the state's pre-removal procedures were constitutionally defective.
- The District Court issued a judgment declaring the challenged statutes unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement.
- The New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the foster children, and the intervening natural mothers all appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Do the procedural protections provided by New York law for the removal of a foster child from a foster home, where the child has resided for a year or more, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan
No, the procedural protections provided by New York law for the removal of a foster child from a foster home do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Assuming, without deciding, that a foster family's interest in its integrity is a protected 'liberty' interest, the court found New York's procedures to be constitutionally adequate. The Court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest. It concluded that New York's system—which includes pre-removal administrative conferences, post-removal administrative hearings, and, for children in care for over 18 months, a pre-removal judicial hearing under Social Services Law § 392—provides sufficient opportunity to be heard and protects against arbitrary removals. The Court held that due process is flexible and does not require a mandatory, automatic judicial hearing in every case before a child can be removed from a foster home.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. The concurring justices would hold that the interests asserted by the foster parents and children are not the kind of 'liberty' or 'property' interests that the Due Process Clause protects. The foster family relationship is a temporary status wholly created, defined, and controlled by state law, which gives the state discretion to remove the child. Foster parents have no state-created right or justifiable expectation that the relationship will be permanent. Since there is no constitutionally protected interest at stake, the procedural due process inquiry is unnecessary, and the state's procedures are constitutionally sufficient.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the limited constitutional status of the foster family relationship, distinguishing it from the constitutionally protected natural family. While the majority left open the possibility of recognizing a liberty interest in the foster family, it affirmed that any such interest is heavily qualified by its origin in state law and by the superior rights of the natural parents. The Court's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test reinforces the flexibility of due process, allowing states to satisfy constitutional requirements with a combination of administrative and judicial procedures rather than a single, rigid requirement for a pre-removal judicial hearing. The ruling gives states significant leeway in designing their foster care systems, balancing the need for stability for the child against the state's goals of family reunification and adoption.
