Smith v. Murray
477 U.S. 527 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A defense counsel's deliberate, tactical decision not to raise a constitutional claim on direct appeal, based on a reasonable assessment of existing law, does not constitute "cause" sufficient to excuse a procedural default for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review.
Facts:
- Michael Marnell Smith encountered Audrey Weiler in a secluded area, raped her at knifepoint, and then murdered her by strangulation, drowning, and stabbing.
- Prior to trial, Smith's appointed counsel, David Pugh, arranged for a psychiatric examination by Dr. Wendell Pile to explore potential psychiatric defenses.
- Pugh advised Smith generally not to discuss prior criminal episodes but did not specifically instruct him regarding the examination with Dr. Pile.
- During the examination, for which Smith was not given Miranda-style warnings, Smith told Dr. Pile about the murder and a prior incident where he tore the clothes off a girl on a school bus.
- Dr. Pile's report, which included Smith's admission about the school bus incident and a diagnosis of 'Sociopathic Personality,' was sent to the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Virginia trial court.
- At the sentencing phase, Smith's counsel objected to the admission of testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Pile, but the objection was overruled.
- Smith, as appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the state's highest court.
- On appeal, Smith's counsel consciously decided not to assign error to the admission of Dr. Pile's testimony, though an amicus curiae brief did raise the issue.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence, declining to address arguments raised only by the amicus.
- Smith filed a state habeas corpus petition in a Virginia Circuit Court, arguing the admission of Dr. Pile's testimony violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
- The state court denied the petition, finding the claim was procedurally defaulted for not being raised on direct appeal.
- Smith then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
- The District Court denied the petition, holding the claim was barred by procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes.
- Smith, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition, but on the grounds that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless, not on procedural default grounds.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a defense counsel's deliberate, tactical decision not to raise a constitutional claim on direct appeal, based on a perceived futility under existing state law, constitute 'cause' sufficient to excuse the procedural default and allow for federal habeas corpus review?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No. A deliberate, tactical decision by counsel not to pursue a particular claim on appeal is the antithesis of 'cause' for a procedural default and does not warrant excusing the failure to adhere to state procedural rules. The Court held that federal habeas courts must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 'cause and prejudice' standard that applies to trial defaults, as established in Wainwright v. Sykes. Here, counsel consciously elected not to pursue the claim regarding Dr. Pile's testimony on appeal, perceiving it had little chance of success under Virginia law. This tactical decision, even if it proved incorrect in hindsight, does not constitute 'cause.' The Court rejected the arguments that the decision was based on ignorance or amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal' is a hallmark of effective advocacy. Furthermore, the claim was not so novel as to be unavailable, since similar claims were being litigated at the time. Finally, the Court found that refusing to hear the claim would not result in a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice,' as that exception is primarily concerned with 'actual innocence,' and the admission of the testimony did not pervert the jury's deliberations with false evidence.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The procedural default should be excused because the underlying constitutional claim is meritorious and there is a significant risk that Smith will be executed because of a constitutional violation. The dissent argued that the default was minor, as the objection was made at trial and an amicus brief raised the issue on appeal. Counsel's decision not to raise the claim was reasonable given the adverse state precedent at the time. The majority's focus on 'actual innocence' for the miscarriage of justice exception is too narrow; fundamental fairness, especially in a capital case, should also be considered. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is a core constitutional value, and its violation during the sentencing phase rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. The state's interest in enforcing its procedural rule in this context is outweighed by the gravity of the death penalty and the substantial constitutional claim at stake.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the stringent 'cause and prejudice' standard from Wainwright v. Sykes to procedural defaults occurring at the appellate stage, not just at trial. It significantly narrows the path for federal habeas relief by holding that a lawyer's reasonable, tactical decision to abandon a claim on appeal cannot constitute 'cause,' even if the lawyer misjudged the legal landscape. The case reinforces the principles of finality and comity by giving great deference to state procedural rules and the strategic choices of counsel. It also narrowly construes the 'fundamental miscarriage of justice' exception, tying it almost exclusively to claims of actual innocence, thereby making it more difficult for petitioners to overcome a procedural default by arguing about the fairness of their sentencing proceeding.
