Smith v. Illinois
469 U.S. 91 (1984)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An accused's post-request responses to further police interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of their initial, unambiguous request for counsel. Once an accused has clearly invoked their right to counsel, all questioning must cease immediately.
Facts:
- Eighteen-year-old Steven Smith was arrested for armed robbery and taken to an interrogation room.
- Two police detectives began advising Smith of his Miranda rights.
- Upon being informed that he had the right to consult with a lawyer and have one present during questioning, Smith stated, 'Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that.'
- Instead of ceasing the interrogation, the officers continued reading the Miranda warnings.
- The officers then asked Smith, 'Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?'
- Smith replied, 'Yeah and no, uh, I don’t know what’s what, really.'
- After a brief further exchange, Smith agreed to talk and subsequently made incriminating statements.
- Later in the interrogation, Smith stated again, 'I wanta get a lawyer,' at which point the interrogation was terminated.
Procedural Posture:
- Steven Smith was charged with armed robbery in an Illinois trial court.
- Smith filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his confession, which the trial court denied.
- Following a trial where the confession was admitted as evidence, Smith was convicted.
- Smith appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, which affirmed the conviction, holding that his request for counsel was not effective because his subsequent statements created ambiguity.
- Smith then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision in a 4-3 vote.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
May an accused's responses to subsequent police questioning be used to cast doubt on the clarity of their initial, unequivocal request for counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. An accused's post-request responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself. The rule established in Edwards v. Arizona requires that once an accused expresses a desire to deal with the police only through counsel, they are not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made available. The analysis involves two distinct inquiries: invocation and waiver. Smith's statement, 'Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that,' was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The lower courts erred by merging the distinct inquiries of invocation and waiver, using Smith's subsequent, hesitant responses to find his initial, clear request to be ambiguous. This approach undermines the 'bright-line' prophylactic rule of Edwards, which is designed to prevent police from badgering a suspect into waiving their rights after they have been invoked.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The entirety of the colloquy, including the suspect's subsequent statements, should be considered to determine if an initial request for counsel was truly clear and unequivocal. The majority improperly re-litigates an essentially factual inquiry that the Illinois courts, which could assess tone and demeanor, had already decided. Smith's statement was not made during an 'interrogation' but during the administration of Miranda warnings, and the officer's follow-up questions were a reasonable attempt to clarify Smith's uncertain statement. The entire brief exchange should be viewed as a whole, and in that context, Smith did not clearly assert his right to counsel until later in the interrogation, at which point the police properly ceased questioning.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the 'bright-line' rule of Edwards v. Arizona by establishing a clear temporal limit on the evidence courts can consider when evaluating a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel. By prohibiting the use of post-request statements to challenge the clarity of the initial request, the Court prevents police from strategically continuing an interrogation to create ambiguity where none existed. This decision strengthens the protection against coerced waivers of Fifth Amendment rights, forcing a sharp distinction between the act of invoking the right to counsel and the separate act of potentially waiving it later. It creates a clearer, more rigid protocol for law enforcement to follow once a suspect mentions wanting an attorney.
Unlock the full brief for Smith v. Illinois