Smith v. Hooey
393 U.S. 374 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Sixth Amendment, a state has a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring a defendant to trial, even when the defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. A state cannot absolve itself of this duty simply because the accused is imprisoned by a different sovereign, such as the federal government.
Facts:
- In 1960, the petitioner was indicted on a theft charge in Harris County, Texas.
- At the time of his indictment and for years after, the petitioner was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Shortly after the indictment, the petitioner mailed a letter to the Texas trial court requesting a speedy trial.
- The court replied that he would be afforded a trial within two weeks of any date he specified at which he could be present.
- For the next six years, the petitioner continuously sent letters and formal motions to the Texas court, demanding to be brought to trial.
- Throughout this six-year period, the State of Texas took no action to obtain the petitioner's appearance in its court.
Procedural Posture:
- The petitioner filed a verified motion to dismiss the state theft charge in the Texas trial court, which took no action.
- The petitioner then brought a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Texas, asking for an order to show cause why the charge should not be dismissed.
- The Supreme Court of Texas denied the writ of mandamus, relying on its precedent in Cooper v. State.
- The petitioner sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by failing to make any effort to secure his presence for trial for over six years, solely because the defendant is incarcerated in a federal prison?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. A state violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by failing to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial simply because he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. The purposes of the speedy trial right—to prevent oppressive incarceration, minimize the accused's anxiety, and limit impairment to the defense—are aggravated when the accused is imprisoned elsewhere. An outstanding charge can negatively impact the conditions of current confinement, eligibility for parole, and the possibility of receiving a concurrent sentence. Moreover, a long delay while incarcerated severely impairs a defendant's ability to locate witnesses and prepare a defense. The Court rejected Texas's argument that it lacked power and authority over a federal prisoner, noting that federal and state governments have established procedures for cooperation, such as the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Citing Barber v. Page, the Court held that just as a witness is not 'unavailable' for Confrontation Clause purposes merely for being in an out-of-state prison, an accused is not beyond the reach of the speedy trial guarantee, and the state must make a good-faith effort to secure his presence.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. Justice Black concurred with the Court's opinion and judgment but wrote separately to emphasize that the case should be set aside for the purpose of giving the petitioner a trial, not for automatic dismissal of the charges.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes. Justice Harlan agreed that a state must make a reasonable effort to secure the presence of an accused incarcerated in another jurisdiction, but would base the decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment. He argued that the Court should provide more explicit guidance on remand, suggesting that Texas should try the petitioner immediately and that if the petitioner shows prejudice from the delay, the burden should shift to the state to prove otherwise.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
Yes. Justice White joined the majority opinion with the understanding that the remand leaves open for the Texas courts to decide the ultimate question of whether the criminal proceedings must be dismissed due to the delay.
Analysis:
Smith v. Hooey is significant for extending the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right to defendants incarcerated in other jurisdictions, dismantling the 'separate sovereigns' doctrine as an excuse for prosecutorial inaction. The decision places an affirmative, constitutional duty on states to make a diligent, good-faith effort to secure an out-of-state prisoner for trial upon demand. This holding prevents states from indefinitely shelving charges against prisoners, thereby protecting them from the unique prejudices that arise from such delays, including lost opportunities for concurrent sentences and parole. The case reinforces a practical, rather than purely theoretical, approach to constitutional rights, focusing on inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
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