No, this law is not an illegal extra punishment. Its main goal is to protect the public, which is a civil, not a criminal, purpose. Even though being on a public list is embarrassing and difficult, the court said that's just a side effect of a law designed to keep communities safe. Since the law's primary purpose is safety, it's considered a civil rule, not a criminal punishment that would be illegal to apply to past crimes.

I agree the law is okay, but the court shouldn't have focused on the state using the internet. We should only look at what the law itself says. The law doesn't say 'put it on the internet,' so how the state carries out the law shouldn't be part of the decision.

This was a really tough call, but the law should stand. It's unclear if the lawmakers meant for this to be a punishment or a safety rule, as there's evidence for both. Since it's so close, we should lean toward trusting that the state passed a constitutional law.

Yes, this is definitely an extra punishment. It puts serious restrictions on people's lives, it's only for those who committed a crime, and it's a direct result of that crime. That's the definition of punishment, and you can't add more punishment to someone after they've already been sentenced.

Yes, this law acts as a punishment. The biggest problem is that it's excessive and doesn't care if a person has changed. An offender has to register for life and be publicly shamed, even if they've gone through treatment and are proven to no longer be a danger. A safety law should be smarter than that; because this one isn't, it looks more like punishment.

No, making sex offenders register is not extra punishment because the law was intended to protect the public, not punish past crimes. Even though it makes life harder for sex offenders, it's not the same as putting them in jail or other historical punishments. The law has a valid non-criminal purpose of public safety, especially since sex offenders often repeat their crimes.

Forcing sex offenders to register and have their information published is additional punishment, and it's unconstitutional to apply this punishment to people convicted before the law existed. The law severely burdens and shames offenders based only on their past crimes, not their current dangerousness, which shows it is mainly punitive, not regulatory.

The Alaska law is unconstitutional extra punishment because it imposes very harsh, long-term burdens on all sex offenders without considering their individual risk of committing future crimes or the possibility of rehabilitation. Even if the law's purpose seems non-criminal, its extreme negative effects on offenders' lives make it too punitive to apply to old cases.

To decide if a law is criminal punishment or a civil regulation, courts should only look at what the law itself actually requires people to do, not any additional consequences of the law like posting information on the Internet. The majority opinion shouldn't have considered those other effects.

There are good arguments on both sides for whether the Alaska law is mainly civil regulation or criminal punishment. But since it's a close case and states' laws are assumed to be constitutional, the tie goes to Alaska and the law should be allowed based on that assumption alone.

If... the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is `so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention'to deem it civil

In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of Alaska's sex offender registration law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

—"only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,"

—the Supreme Court considered the "claim that a sex offender registration and notification law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause,"

The United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex offender registration does not constitute punishment

In conducting its review, the court concluded that "The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is …

—stating that "most significant" factor in determining that Alaska's sex offender registration statute was not an ex post facto law, was its rational connection to the nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from sex offenders

—the Supreme Court upheld Alaska's sex-offender-registration statute, finding that it was not punitive, but civil in nature, and not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court found that an Alaska version of "Megan's Law," which required sex offenders to register with the State, was a civil statute and was not subject to the ex post facto prohibitions of the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court has noted that there are "grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is `frightening and high.'"

No, the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the legislature intended to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme, and the Act's effects are not so punitive as to negate that intent. The court applies a two-part test: first, it ascertains the legislature's intent, and second, it examines the law's effects. Here, the legislature's stated intent was to protect the public, a legitimate civil and non-punitive goal. Applying the factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez to the Act's effects, the court found the law does not constitute punishment. While the notification resembles historical shaming, its purpose is to disseminate truthful, public information for safety, not to humiliate. The registration requirements are not an affirmative restraint like imprisonment or parole, and any negative consequences flow from the public fact of conviction, not the Act itself. The law's requirements are rationally connected to the non-punitive purpose of public safety and are not excessive, as the state can make reasonable categorical judgments about the risks posed by sex offenders as a class.

Yes, the law is not punitive, but the court's analysis should be limited to the obligations created by the statute on its face, not how the state chooses to implement it. By considering whether internet dissemination renders the Act punitive, the majority has strayed from the statutory text itself, which does not mandate a specific means of public notification. The Ex Post Facto analysis should be confined to the statute's actual requirements, not the administrative choices made in its execution.

No, the Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, but this is a very close case where the presumption of constitutionality tips the scale. The evidence of legislative intent is ambiguous, with some parts of the Act placed in the civil code and others in the criminal procedure code, making the majority's 'clearest proof' standard inappropriate. The Act's effects, particularly the public dissemination of information leading to humiliation and ostracism, bear a strong resemblance to historical punishment. Because the evidence for both civil and punitive character is in 'rough equipoise,' the law should be upheld based on the presumption that a state's law is constitutional.

Yes, the retroactive application of the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because the registration and reporting obligations are inherently punitive. A sanction is punishment when it (1) constitutes a severe deprivation of liberty, (2) is imposed on everyone convicted of a relevant offense, and (3) is imposed only on those criminals. The Act meets all three criteria, as the reporting duties and severe public stigma unquestionably affect a constitutionally protected liberty interest and are triggered solely by a prior criminal conviction. These sanctions are a direct part of the offender's punishment and cannot be retroactively added to sentences already served.

Yes, the Act's retroactive application is unconstitutional because its effects are punitive. Given the ambiguity of the legislature's intent, the court should neutrally evaluate the law's effects using the Mendoza-Martinez factors without requiring the 'clearest proof' of punitive character. The Act imposes an affirmative disability, resembles historical shaming punishments, and is triggered by past crime rather than current dangerousness. Most importantly, the Act is excessive in relation to its public safety purpose because it makes no provision for rehabilitation; offenders remain subject to lifelong registration and public notification regardless of clear evidence that they no longer pose a threat to the community.

No, the retroactive application of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the legislature intended to create a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme to protect the public from sex offenders. The Act's effects are not so punitive as to negate the State's intention. The court emphasized the rational connection to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and noted the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders. While the Act imposes burdens on offenders, they are not so severe as to constitute punishment. The Act's registration and notification provisions are not akin to historical punishments and serve a legitimate civil purpose.

The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's registration and reporting obligations are punitive and the retroactive application of the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Act imposes severe, intrusive, and long-lasting burdens on convicted sex offenders, closely resembling historical forms of punishment. The Act is triggered solely by past conviction, not present dangerousness, indicating a retributive rather than regulatory purpose. Registration and publication may be acceptable for post-enactment convictions, but not for offenders convicted before the Act's passage.

The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect, making its retroactive application incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Act imposes onerous, intrusive, and long-lasting obligations on former sex offenders, resembling historical forms of punishment. Its operation hinges on past conviction alone, rather than current dangerousness, and it makes no provision for rehabilitation, imposing requirements on all offenders regardless of their individual risk of recidivism. These factors, along with the Act's excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose, indicate that it is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively.

The determination of whether a law is civil or criminal must be limited to the analysis of the obligations actually created by the statute on its face. The majority opinion strays from this principle by considering whether the Act's provisions, such as Internet dissemination of information, render it punitive. The proper analysis looks only to what the statute itself requires.

This is a close case, with considerable evidence supporting both civil and punitive understandings of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. The formal indicators of legislative intent are mixed, and the Act imposes significant burdens on former offenders, resembling historical forms of punishment. However, in light of the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded to state laws, the Act should be upheld as civil and regulatory based on the presumption alone.

Smith v. Doe

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot