Smith v. Crawford
2005 WL 2140858, 937 So. 2d 451 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
If a defendant's counsel impermissibly implies to the jury that the defendant lacks liability insurance and will personally pay a judgment, the plaintiff's counsel is justified in responding in kind to rebut that implication. A trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard the plaintiff's justified responsive statement constitutes reversible error.
Facts:
- Dewey Smith and Hattie Crawford were involved in a motor vehicle accident.
- Crawford admitted that the accident was her fault.
- The only issue to be decided at trial was the amount of damages owed to the Smiths.
- During closing arguments, Crawford's attorney stated that Crawford 'did not want to pay for or be responsible for any damage which her negligence did not cause.'
- In response, the Smiths' attorney stated during his closing argument, 'I covenant with the jury that not a dime of any sum the jury might award the Smiths would come from the pocket of Mrs. Crawford.'
Procedural Posture:
- Dewey and Sylvia Smith filed a personal injury action against Hattie Crawford in the Circuit Court of Hinds County (the trial court).
- The case proceeded to a jury trial on the sole issue of damages, as Crawford had admitted liability for the accident.
- During closing arguments, Crawford's attorney objected to a statement made by the Smiths' attorney.
- The trial judge sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement made by the Smiths' attorney.
- The jury returned a verdict awarding Dewey Smith $3,213 in damages and awarding nothing to Sylvia Smith for loss of consortium.
- The Smiths filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- The Smiths (appellants) appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial to the Court of Appeals of Mississippi, with Crawford as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by instructing a jury to disregard a plaintiff's closing argument statement that the defendant will not personally pay the judgment, when that statement was made in direct response to the defendant's counsel improperly implying that the defendant would have to pay the judgment out-of-pocket?
Opinions:
Majority - Irving, J.
Yes, the trial court committed reversible error. The court held that a defendant's counsel's statement implying their client would be personally responsible for a judgment is an impermissible reference to the absence of liability insurance. Citing Snowden v. Webb, the court found that when a defendant's attorney 'opens the door' with such an improper argument, the plaintiff's attorney is justified in responding in kind to 'remove the sting' of the remark. Crawford's counsel's statement was an impermissible intimation that she would personally pay, which justified the rebuttal by the Smiths' counsel. By instructing the jury to disregard the Smiths' justified response, the trial court left Crawford's prejudicial suggestion unrebutted, creating a serious risk that the jury would diminish the damage award out of sympathy. This abuse of discretion warranted a new trial.
Dissenting - Lee, P.J.
No, the trial court did not commit reversible error. The dissent argued that the statement by Crawford's attorney—that she 'did not want to pay for or be responsible for any damage which her negligence did not cause'—did not impermissibly imply a lack of insurance. Instead, it was a standard argument that a defendant should only be held liable for damages they actually caused. Unlike the explicit language in precedent cases, this statement did not create a 'sting' that needed to be removed. Because Crawford's attorney did not 'open the door' with an improper argument, the response by the Smiths' attorney was itself improper. Therefore, the trial court correctly instructed the jury to disregard it and did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the 'invited response' or 'opening the door' doctrine concerning references to liability insurance in Mississippi tort law. It establishes that even a subtle or ambiguous statement implying a defendant will pay a judgment personally can be deemed improper, thereby justifying a direct rebuttal from the plaintiff. The ruling's key significance is that it deems a trial court's failure to allow such a justified rebuttal to be reversible error, as it creates an unfair argumentative imbalance. This precedent strengthens the prohibition against influencing juries with information about a party's insured status and provides a clear remedy for plaintiffs when defendants attempt to gain sympathy by suggesting they are uninsured.
