Smith v. City of Salem
378 F.3d 566 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
Discrimination against an individual for failing to conform to gender stereotypes is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This protection applies to all employees, including those who are transsexual, as the discrimination is based on the non-conforming behavior itself, irrespective of its cause.
Facts:
- Jimmie L. Smith, a biologically male lieutenant, was employed by the Salem Fire Department for seven years with a positive work record.
- After being diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), Smith began to express a more feminine appearance and mannerisms at work, consistent with medical protocols for his condition.
- Smith's co-workers began to question his appearance and comment that his mannerisms were not 'masculine enough'.
- Smith confidentially informed his immediate supervisor, Thomas Eastek, of his GID diagnosis and treatment plan, but Eastek relayed this information to his own superior, Fire Chief Walter Greenamyer.
- Greenamyer and other city officials, including Law Director Brooke Zellers and Mayor Larry DeJane, held a meeting to devise a plan to terminate Smith's employment.
- The officials planned to compel Smith to undergo multiple psychological evaluations with the hope that he would either resign or refuse to comply, which would create grounds for termination due to insubordination.
- Another official who was present at the meeting, Henry Willard, secretly telephoned Smith afterwards to warn him of the plan, which Willard described as a 'witch hunt'.
Procedural Posture:
- After Smith's attorney contacted city officials, Fire Chief Greenamyer suspended Smith for one 24-hour shift for an alleged policy infraction.
- The Salem Civil Service Commission held a hearing and upheld Smith's suspension.
- Smith appealed the Commission's decision to the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, a state trial court.
- The Court of Common Pleas reversed the suspension, finding the underlying policy was not in effect.
- Smith filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the City of Salem and various officials, alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Smith's federal claims.
- Smith, as Plaintiff-Appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does discriminating against an employee for failure to conform to sex stereotypes, specifically by targeting a biological male for expressing a more feminine appearance and mannerisms, constitute discrimination 'because of sex' as prohibited by Title VII?
Opinions:
Majority - R. Guy Cole, Jr.
Yes, discriminating against an employee for failure to conform to sex stereotypes constitutes discrimination 'because of sex' under Title VII. The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins established that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination extends to gender discrimination, including discrimination based on an employee's failure to conform to gender norms. The reasoning in Price Waterhouse, which protected a woman who did not act 'feminine enough,' applies equally to a man who does not act 'masculine enough.' The district court erred by focusing on Smith's status as a transsexual, as the proper focus is on the alleged discriminatory animus, which was Smith's gender non-conforming behavior and appearance. Pre-Price Waterhouse cases that denied Title VII protection to transsexuals by distinguishing between 'sex' and 'gender' have been 'eviscerated' by the Supreme Court's holding. Therefore, an employee's status as a transsexual is not a bar to a claim of sex discrimination under a sex-stereotyping theory.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarified the scope of Title VII's protection against sex discrimination by explicitly applying the sex-stereotyping theory from Price Waterhouse to a transsexual plaintiff. By shifting the legal inquiry from the plaintiff's identity or 'status' (e.g., as a transsexual) to the employer's discriminatory motive (punishing gender non-conformity), the court effectively extended Title VII protections to transgender and gender non-conforming individuals. This ruling undermined a line of older cases that had categorically excluded such claims and was a crucial step in the evolution of jurisprudence that eventually led to the Supreme Court's holding in Bostock v. Clayton County. It established a vital precedent within the Sixth Circuit that gender identity discrimination is a cognizable form of sex discrimination.
