Smallen Revocable Living Trust v. Western Union Company
950 F.3d 1297 (2020)
Rule of Law:
To adequately plead scienter for securities fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), a plaintiff must state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud or recklessness, such that this inference is at least as compelling as any opposing non-culpable inference.
Facts:
- The Western Union Company (Western Union) operates the world’s largest money-transfer service through an international network of over 500,000 agent locations.
- Hikmet Ersek served as Western Union’s Chief Executive Officer and President since September 2010, Scott T. Scheirman was CFO until December 31, 2013, and Rajesh K. Agrawal served as CFO since July 2014.
- Between January 1, 2004, and August 29, 2015, Western Union received at least 550,928 consumer complaints concerning over $632 million in fraudulent transactions, some of which involved Western Union's agents in various countries.
- Materials from Western Union board and committee meetings between May 2010 and October 2013 included discussions about increased regulatory attention to agents and the need for improved anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-fraud compliance programs in high-risk regions.
- On January 19, 2017, Western Union reached a joint settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), agreeing to pay $586 million to resolve investigations into its AML and anti-fraud programs.
- As part of the DOJ settlement, Western Union entered a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) wherein it admitted to willfully failing to implement an effective AML compliance program from 2004 through December 2012.
- The price of Western Union stock shares declined following the announcement of the Joint Settlement.
Procedural Posture:
- Lawrence Henry Smallen and Laura Anne Smallen Revocable Living Trust (Plaintiff), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint against The Western Union Company and several current and former executive officers (Defendants) in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
- The complaint alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 for making false or materially misleading public statements regarding Western Union’s compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-fraud laws, and Section 20(a) claims against the individual defendants.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).
- The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, holding that the complaint failed to create a strong inference of scienter as required by the PSLRA for the Section 10(b) claims, and consequently, the Section 20(a) claims could not proceed.
- Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a complaint alleging securities fraud against a money-transfer company and its executives, based on public statements about legal compliance, satisfy the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's heightened pleading standard for scienter by providing particularized facts that create a strong inference of intent to defraud or recklessness?
Opinions:
Majority - Baldock, Circuit Judge
No, the complaint fails to plead particularized facts giving rise to the strong inference of scienter required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to state a claim for securities fraud. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding that while the complaint alleged numerous compliance problems and government investigations, it lacked specific facts demonstrating the individual defendants made statements with an intent to defraud or conscious disregard of the risk that shareholders would be misled. The court explained that to establish a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the defendant acted with scienter, defined as 'a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,' or 'recklessness.' Recklessness in this context is 'conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it,' akin to conscious disregard rather than mere negligence or gross negligence. The PSLRA imposes a heightened pleading standard requiring particularized facts giving rise to a 'strong inference' of scienter, which 'must be more than merely plausible or reasonable' and 'at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged,' as per Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. The court systematically rejected Plaintiff's arguments based on various categories of alleged facts: (1) 'red flags' like consumer complaints and agent arrests were insufficient because Plaintiff failed to particularize the individual defendants' awareness of the fraud or the ineffectiveness of specific compliance programs, and the dollar amount of fraud, while significant, was a small percentage of overall transfers. (2) Discussions at board and committee meetings about compliance improvements were dismissed as 'mere attendance at meetings does not contribute to an inference of scienter' and did not equate to knowledge of ongoing, unaddressed violations. (3) Government investigations, while relevant, lacked particularized allegations showing the individual defendants themselves dealt with regulators, reviewed underlying documents, or were informed of ongoing legal noncompliance during the Class Period. Even for CEO Ersek, who was regularly briefed, the allegations did not establish he was informed about ongoing, unaddressed compliance violations. (4) The DPA admissions and FTC conclusions were deemed 'fraud by hindsight,' as these subsequent revelations do not prove the individual defendants knew of falsity at the time of their challenged statements. (5) Allegations of motive through insider stock sales by Ersek and Agrawal were found not unusual when viewed in context (e.g., increased aggregate holdings, sales being a fraction of total holdings), and the absence of sales by Scheirman further weakened this argument. Considering all allegations holistically, the court concluded that the inference of scienter was 'neither cogent nor as compelling as the competing inference of nonfraudulent intent,' which was that the individual defendants were overly optimistic about Western Union’s compliance systems rather than intentionally misleading investors or consciously disregarding risks. The court also declined to adopt a broad theory of 'corporate scienter' that would impute the scienter of any corporate agent to the company, instead requiring the state of mind of 'the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion therein, or the like).' Even under this more limited view, the complaint failed to raise a strong inference of scienter for other named executives or unnamed compliance officers. Since no primary violation of securities laws was adequately pleaded, Plaintiff’s Section 20(a) control-person claims also failed.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the demanding pleading requirements for scienter under the PSLRA in the Tenth Circuit. It clarifies that even widespread corporate misconduct and extensive government investigations may not suffice if a plaintiff cannot particularize which specific corporate officials possessed the requisite state of mind (intent to defraud or conscious recklessness) at the time of the alleged misstatements. The ruling emphasizes that alleged actions must rise above mere negligence, gross negligence, or misplaced optimism. By rejecting a broad 'corporate scienter' theory, the court places a heavier burden on plaintiffs to tie scienter directly to individuals responsible for the challenged public statements, making it more challenging to hold corporate entities liable for securities fraud without establishing individual executive culpability.
