Slack v. Truitt
791 A.2d 129, 2002 Md. LEXIS 45, 368 Md. 2 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A will that is facially valid, bearing the genuine signatures of the testator and two witnesses, is presumed to have been duly executed, even without a formal attestation clause. This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and a witness's failure to recall the details of the execution is insufficient to rebut the presumption.
Facts:
- Dale Slack drafted a one-page, handwritten document intended to be his will.
- On July 5, 1999, Slack asked his neighbor, Dorothy Morgan, to sign the document under a line that read 'Witnessed By.'
- Slack did not inform Morgan that the document was a will; she believed she was signing a neighborhood petition.
- Morgan did not notice Slack's signature on the document and could not later recall if it had been signed when she added her signature.
- Approximately five minutes later, Slack asked Morgan's daughter, Sandra Bradley, to also sign the document as a witness.
- Slack did not tell Bradley the nature of the document, but Bradley was able to recall seeing Slack's signature on it before she signed.
- The will named Michael Truitt and Terri Truitt as beneficiaries.
- About two hours after obtaining the signatures, Dale Slack committed suicide.
Procedural Posture:
- Clinton A. Slack, the decedent's brother, filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court for Cecil County (a court of first instance for probate matters) to be appointed personal representative.
- Terri Truitt, a beneficiary, filed a competing petition in the same court asking for the handwritten will to be probated.
- The Orphans’ Court denied admission of the will to probate.
- Truitt filed a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Cecil County (a trial court of general jurisdiction).
- The Circuit Court also declined to admit the will to probate.
- Truitt, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (an intermediate appellate court), with Clinton Slack as appellee.
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding the will was validly executed.
- Clinton Slack, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) to review the decision.
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Issue:
Does a will signed by a testator outside the witnesses' presence satisfy the statutory attestation requirement when one witness did not know the document was a will and cannot recall seeing the testator's signature, but the will is otherwise facially valid?
Opinions:
Majority - Raker, J.
Yes, the will satisfies the statutory attestation requirement. A presumption of due execution attaches to a will that, on its face, bears every indicia of validity, even without a formal attestation clause. Where a testator signs outside the witnesses' presence, he need only acknowledge the will as his act, which can be done through conduct. Because the will appeared facially valid—written and signed by Slack, with two witness signatures below the words 'Witnessed By'—it is presumed to be properly executed. The burden shifts to the challenger to overcome this presumption with clear and convincing evidence of a flaw in the execution. One witness's failure to recall seeing the testator's signature is insufficient to meet this high evidentiary burden, as courts recognize that memory fades and such a rule would invalidate many otherwise valid wills. As there was no evidence of fraud and the second witness did see the signature, the presumption of due execution was not overcome.
Dissenting - Battaglia, J.
No, the will does not satisfy the statutory attestation requirement. The majority improperly extends the presumption of due execution and its high 'clear and convincing' rebuttal standard to a will lacking an attestation clause. Without such a clause, there should be no presumption of validity; rather, the court should determine based on a preponderance of the evidence whether the statutory formalities were met. The statute requires a will to be 'attested,' which is a formal act of witnessing. One witness, Morgan, did not know it was a will, believed it was a petition, and did not see the testator's signature; she therefore could not have 'attested' to anything. Since the statute requires two valid attestations and only one was arguably present, the will is invalid. To uphold the will based merely on genuine signatures renders the separate statutory requirement of 'attestation' meaningless.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the presumption of due execution in Maryland, applying it to wills that lack a formal attestation clause but are otherwise facially valid. By doing so, the court makes it substantially more difficult to challenge a will based on a witness's faulty memory or careless observation during the signing ceremony. The ruling prioritizes evidence of the testator's intent, as suggested by a properly signed document, over strict, affirmative proof of every ceremonial formality. This lowers the bar for a will's admission to probate in cases with ambiguous witness testimony, potentially saving many informally executed wills from being invalidated.
