Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (2000)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A habeas corpus petition filed after an initial petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a 'second or successive' petition. To obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge a procedural dismissal, a petitioner must make a substantial showing that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the correctness of the procedural ruling and whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.
Facts:
- In 1990, Antonio Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in a Nevada state court.
- After his direct appeal failed, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on November 27, 1991.
- During the federal proceeding, Slack realized he had additional legal claims that he had not yet presented to the Nevada state courts.
- Under the 'exhaustion of remedies' rule, a federal court cannot hear claims that have not first been raised in state court.
- Slack's 1991 federal petition was therefore dismissed 'without prejudice' in order to allow him to return to state court and present his unexhausted claims.
- After unsuccessfully pursuing his claims in state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed a new federal habeas petition on May 30, 1995.
- This new petition contained claims from his original 1991 petition as well as new claims that he had just litigated in state court.
Procedural Posture:
- Antonio Slack filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court in 1991.
- The District Court dismissed the 1991 petition 'without prejudice' to allow Slack to exhaust unlitigated claims in state court.
- Slack filed a new federal habeas petition in the same District Court in 1995 after completing state proceedings.
- The State, as respondent, moved to dismiss the 1995 petition, arguing it was a 'second or successive' petition and an abuse of the writ.
- The District Court granted the State's motion, dismissing the petition on procedural grounds.
- Slack filed a notice of appeal, which the District Court treated as an application for a certificate of probable cause (the pre-AEDPA standard) and denied.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also denied a certificate of probable cause, thereby refusing to hear his appeal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the correct standard for appeal and whether Slack's petition was 'second or successive'.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a habeas corpus petition filed after an initial petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies considered a 'second or successive' petition, thereby subjecting it to dismissal for abuse of the writ?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. A habeas petition filed after an initial petition was dismissed without an adjudication on the merits for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a 'second or successive' petition. The Court reasoned that its prior holding in Rose v. Lundy, which requires dismissal of 'mixed petitions' containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, contemplated that the prisoner could return to federal court after exhausting the claims. Such a dismissal is not a judgment on the merits, and the subsequent petition should be treated as any other 'first petition.' The Court also established a two-part standard for issuing a Certificate of Appealability (COA) when a petition is dismissed on procedural grounds: the petitioner must show that jurists of reason would find it debatable (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Finally, the Court held that the COA requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to any appeal initiated after the Act's effective date, regardless of when the underlying habeas petition was filed in district court.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Agrees with the judgment and the majority's reasoning regarding the 'second or successive' petition issue and the standard for a COA. However, this opinion disagrees with the majority's conclusion in Part II that AEDPA's COA rules apply to this case. Justice Stevens would have held that the pre-AEDPA rules for appeal should govern cases where the original habeas petition was filed before AEDPA's effective date, even if the notice of appeal was filed after.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The petition should be considered 'second or successive.' This opinion argues that the majority distorts the natural meaning of the term. While a petitioner could refile the same claims after exhausting them, Slack's second petition included new claims not raised in the first. This makes it a different, and therefore successive, petition. The dissent warns that the majority's rule allows for vexatious litigation, as prisoners could repeatedly file and withdraw petitions, and that the 'second or successive' bar was specifically designed to prevent this type of abuse.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies habeas corpus procedure, particularly for pro se petitioners who often struggle with the complex exhaustion requirement. By holding that a petition refiled after a dismissal for failure to exhaust is not 'second or successive,' the Court ensures that petitioners are not unfairly penalized for a procedural misstep and get one full opportunity for federal review on the merits. The case also establishes a critical two-part test for appealing procedural dismissals, balancing the goals of judicial efficiency with the need to adjudicate potentially valid constitutional claims. This framework prevents district court procedural errors from foreclosing appellate review of substantial constitutional issues.
