Skowronski v. Sachs
818 N.E.2d 635, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 630 (2004)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An agent acting on behalf of an employer can be held individually liable in tort for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations, especially when made recklessly and coupled with holding oneself out as having expertise while failing to disclose limitations, which can constitute unfair and deceptive practices under G. L. c. 93A, warranting treble damages and attorney’s fees. Additionally, a motion for directed verdict in a bench trial can preserve the issue of sufficiency of evidence for appellate review, even without a formal request for a ruling of law under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64A.
Facts:
- In January 1988, Rapp went to Diamond Jewelers in Worcester, seeking to trade her fifty-two point marquise-shaped diamond ring for a better diamond.
- Barry, whose father and brother owned and operated the store, showed Rapp a larger diamond and appraised it as “F colour [grade] and a clarity grade of VVS1.”
- Barry gave Rapp a business card stating “Graduate Gemologists in Residence Gemological Institute of America” and that the store did appraisals, but he was not qualified to certify the grade of diamonds and failed to inform Rapp of this limitation.
- Rapp traded her original diamond ring and paid $2,625 for the diamond Barry showed her.
- Nearly ten years later, Rapp sought to trade in the purchased diamond with a different jeweler, who informed her that it was a G color grade, not F, and consequently had a lower value.
Procedural Posture:
- Rapp sued Barry in the District Court for misrepresentation and unfair/deceptive practices under G. L. c. 93A.
- A bench trial was held in the District Court, resulting in a judgment of $11,370 in favor of Rapp, including compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorney's fees.
- During the District Court proceedings, Barry filed a motion for directed verdict at the close of Rapp's case and again at the completion of all evidence.
- Barry appealed the District Court's judgment to the Appellate Division (Barry as appellant, Rapp as appellee).
- The Appellate Division dismissed Barry's appeal, concluding that he had failed to preserve any issues for appellate review by not filing requests for rulings of law pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64A(b).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an agent acting on behalf of a store incur individual liability for misrepresentations regarding a diamond's quality when those misrepresentations are recklessly made and accompanied by a failure to disclose the agent's lack of certification qualifications, thereby constituting an unfair and deceptive practice under G. L. c. 93A?
Opinions:
Majority - Greenberg, J.
Yes, an agent acting on behalf of a store does incur individual liability for misrepresentations regarding a diamond's quality when those misrepresentations are recklessly made and accompanied by a failure to disclose the agent's lack of certification qualifications, constituting an unfair and deceptive practice under G. L. c. 93A. The court first addressed the procedural question, ruling that the defendant, Barry, had properly preserved the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for appeal. Although Barry failed to file requests for rulings of law under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64A, the court held that his motion for directed verdict in a bench trial could be treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal under Mass.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(2), as both raise the sufficiency of the evidence issue. Turning to the substantive liability, the court affirmed the District Court's finding that Barry was individually liable for misrepresentation and unfair/deceptive practices. It was undisputed that Barry misrepresented the diamond's quality while acting as an agent. The trial judge's finding that Barry “could have readily ascertained the truth by sending the diamond for a grade certification” sufficiently supported the conclusion that his representation was “recklessly made,” citing Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc. The court emphasized that Barry's misrepresentation, combined with his presentation of himself as a certified appraiser (via his business card) and his failure to disclose his lack of qualification to certify diamond grades, negated his argument that proof of actual knowledge of the inferior grade was required for liability under G. L. c. 231, § 85J, or G. L. c. 93A. The court reiterated the well-established principle that an agent is liable in tort for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations, even when acting on behalf of an employer, citing precedents such as Jefts v. York and Henry W. Savage, Inc. v. Friedberg. Consequently, the award of treble damages and attorney’s fees under G. L. c. 93A was affirmed because Barry's actions constituted reckless and unfair practices. The decision of the Appellate Division dismissing Barry's appeal was vacated, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.
Analysis:
This case offers critical clarification on two distinct legal fronts. Procedurally, it establishes that a motion for directed verdict, despite being uncommon in bench trials, can effectively serve to preserve sufficiency of evidence arguments for appellate review in District Court, thus providing an alternative to the specific rule 64A(b) filing. Substantively, the decision reinforces the principle that individual agents are not insulated from tort liability for their own negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations merely by acting within the scope of employment, particularly under consumer protection statutes like G. L. c. 93A. This promotes greater accountability for individuals engaged in deceptive trade practices and strengthens consumer protections, ensuring that those who recklessly misrepresent facts while claiming expertise face direct consequences.
