Skinner v. Square D Co.
516 N.W.2d 475, 445 Mich. 153 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To establish cause-in-fact in a products liability action based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must present substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that, more likely than not, but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred, precluding reliance on mere possibilities or equally probable theories.
Facts:
- Chester W. Skinner designed and built a homemade tumbling machine for cleaning and finishing metal parts, which consisted of a large metal drum rotated by an electric motor.
- Skinner installed a switch manufactured by Square D Company to control the motor of his tumbling machine.
- To reverse the direction of the tumbling machine, Skinner had to manually disconnect two insulated 'alligator clips' from the motor by hand and then reverse them.
- On February 21, 1986, Skinner was in his shop, and his wife, Doris Skinner, along with two other women, Beulah McBride and Violet Whiting, were in an adjacent room.
- The women heard Skinner cry out and found him standing with his hands above his head, each hand grasping an alligator clip, with electric current passing through his body.
- Skinner freed his left hand, reached for the Square D switch, threw it into the 'off' position, twisted, and fell over dead.
- Plaintiffs claimed the Square D switch was defectively designed due to a 'phantom zone' that made it appear 'off' when it was actually 'on'.
- Plaintiffs also claimed the defendant failed to insulate the switch's handle and failed to warn of the alleged defects.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, representatives for Chester W. Skinner, brought a products liability action against defendant Square D Company in the trial court.
- Defendant Square D Company filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of causation.
- The trial court granted Square D's motion for summary disposition.
- Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition, with one judge dissenting.
- Plaintiffs, as appellants, then applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff in a products liability action, relying solely on circumstantial evidence, present sufficient proof of cause-in-fact to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, thereby precluding summary disposition, when the proposed theory of causation is based on mere speculation or is no more probable than other plausible explanations?
Opinions:
Majority - Cavanagh, C.J.
No, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to prove cause-in-fact in a products liability action does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary disposition when their theory of causation is based on mere speculation or is no more probable than other plausible explanations. The Court emphasized that a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a logical sequence of cause and effect, not mere speculation, and must present substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that, more likely than not, but for the defendant's conduct, the injuries would not have occurred. Here, the plaintiffs' theory was that the faulty switch confused Mr. Skinner into thinking the power was off, causing him to touch live wires. However, the tumbling machine was known to be loud and visibly move when running, which would have cued Mr. Skinner regardless of the switch's indication. The alternative scenario proposed by plaintiffs – that the machine was off because wires were unhooked but power was on due to the faulty switch – lacked evidentiary support for both the unhooked wires and how the power would have been restored. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' causation theory was a mere possibility, not a probability, and their expert testimony lacked a basis in established fact, rendering it insufficient. The claims for failure to insulate and failure to warn were also properly dismissed for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, as there was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Skinner died from an increased shock when he grabbed the switch.
Dissenting - Levin, J.
Yes, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to prove cause-in-fact in a products liability action does create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary disposition when there is room for balancing the probabilities and drawing reasonable inferences better supported by one side than the other. Justice Levin argued that the majority improperly rejected the plaintiff's theory without engaging in a comparative probability analysis of all competing theories, as required by precedent like Kaminski. The dissent highlighted substantial evidence that the tumbling machine was not operating immediately before the accident (lack of noise or movement), which logically inferred that the wires were unhooked but the power was somehow on. Regarding how the power came on, the dissent dismissed accidental events like falling objects or Skinner falling on the switch, leaving the possibilities that Skinner or another person purposefully or accidentally restored power. In either case, Skinner would have had an opportunity to rely on the faulty switch. Furthermore, uncontradicted habit evidence showed Skinner always looked at the switch before touching wires. The dissent also contended that the failure to insulate claim should proceed, citing expert testimony that touching the uninsulated handle could increase the shock's magnitude, and lay witness testimony that Skinner was conscious and communicating before grabbing the switch, suggesting the fatal shock occurred or intensified at that moment.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the evidentiary standard for cause-in-fact in products liability actions, particularly when relying on circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment. It reinforces that a plaintiff must move beyond mere possibilities or equally balanced probabilities, requiring 'substantial evidence' that makes their theory 'more likely than not.' The decision emphasizes that expert testimony must be grounded in established facts, not suppositions. The case serves as a critical precedent for defendants seeking summary disposition in Michigan products liability cases where causation is speculative, making it more challenging for plaintiffs to reach a jury without robust factual support for their causal theories.
