Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
323 U.S. 134 (1944)
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Rule of Law:
Whether time spent waiting on an employer's premises is compensable working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a question of fact determined by the totality of the circumstances in each case. Rulings and interpretations by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, while not controlling, are entitled to judicial deference and should be used for guidance.
Facts:
- Seven employees of the Swift and Company packing plant worked daytime shifts as firefighters or elevator operators.
- Under an oral agreement, they were also required to stay in the on-premises fire hall, or within hailing distance, for three to four nights a week.
- During this on-call night duty, their only task was to respond to fire alarms, which were rare.
- The company provided sleeping quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio for the employees' use during this time.
- Employees were free to sleep, eat, and amuse themselves as they saw fit, provided they were ready to respond to an alarm.
- Employees received their regular weekly salaries for their daytime work, plus a separate, small, fixed payment for each alarm they answered during their on-call time.
Procedural Posture:
- Seven employees sued Swift and Company in the U.S. District Court for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
- The District Court, as the trial court, rendered a judgment in favor of Swift and Company, denying the employees' claim.
- The employees, as appellants, appealed the decision to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for Swift and Company.
- The employees, as petitioners, brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court for review.
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Issue:
Is time spent by employees on an employer's premises, on-call and available for duty but largely inactive, excluded as a matter of law from being compensable 'working time' under the Fair Labor Standards Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Jackson
No. A court cannot conclude as a matter of law that time spent waiting is not working time; instead, it is a factual question that depends on the specific circumstances of the case. No legal principle precludes waiting time from also being working time. The determination requires a case-by-case inquiry into the agreement between the parties, their conduct, the nature of the service, and all surrounding circumstances. A key distinction is whether the employee was 'engaged to wait' (which is compensable) or 'waited to be engaged' (which is not). The lower courts erred by applying a rigid legal rule that waiting time cannot be work. Furthermore, courts should look to the interpretations of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division for guidance. While not binding, these interpretations constitute a body of experience and informed judgment that have the 'power to persuade' based on their thoroughness, validity of reasoning, and consistency.
Analysis:
This case establishes the 'Skidmore deference' standard, a pivotal principle in administrative law. It provides a framework for how courts should treat agency interpretations that do not have the force of law, such as those found in opinion letters or manuals. The decision rejected an all-or-nothing approach to on-call time, mandating a flexible, fact-specific inquiry. This holding significantly impacts wage and hour law by ensuring that the compensability of waiting time is evaluated based on the practical realities of the employment relationship rather than a rigid legal formula, influencing countless future cases involving on-call employees.
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