Sisney v. Best Inc.
2008 S.D. LEXIS 111, 754 N.W.2d 804, 2008 SD 70 (2008)
Rule of Law:
The Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly pleading standard, requiring a complaint to contain sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief, thereby moving beyond the more lenient "no set of facts" standard of Conley v. Gibson.
Facts:
- Charles E. Sisney, a Jewish inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), follows a kosher diet as part of his religion.
- Best Inc. contracted with the State to provide food services, including kosher bread from Metz Baking Company, at the SDSP from February 2000 to July 31, 2002.
- CBM Inc. contracted with the State to provide food services, including food for kosher diets, from August 2002 until December 8, 2004, initially serving Metz bread, then switching to Old Home Bakery bread.
- Sisney later "heard rumors" from other prisoners that the bread Best and CBM provided might not have been "certified" kosher.
- Sisney submitted an administrative grievance, which William Carl Preyer, a food service director and employee of CBM, responded to, stating that the bread had "certification on file."
- In January 2006, Sisney received an affidavit from Preyer in the course of other litigation, stating that CBM did not, at that time, have kosher certification for either the Metz or Old Home Bakery bread that had been provided through December 14, 2004.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles E. Sisney filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, against Best Inc., CBM Inc., and William Carl Preyer, asserting claims under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985, and various state law claims.
- Defendants Best Inc., CBM Inc., and William Carl Preyer moved to dismiss Sisney's complaint under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The circuit court dismissed Sisney's federal constitutional and conspiracy claims, concluding the statute of limitations had expired as to Best and that Sisney failed to assert sufficient facts for his remaining federal claims.
- The circuit court further concluded that Sisney either did not assert sufficient facts or relied on inapplicable statutes to support his state law claims.
- Sisney appealed the circuit court's dismissal and the denial of an opportunity to amend his pleadings to the Supreme Court of South Dakota.
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Issue:
1. Are federal civil rights claims against private actors untimely if filed more than three years after the alleged constitutional deprivation occurred? 2. Does a complaint for federal civil rights violations (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985) against non-state actors sufficiently state a claim if it fails to allege facts suggesting an unconstitutional state policy or custom, or a mutual understanding for a conspiracy, without specific factual support? 3. Does a complaint for state law claims of deceptive trade practices, interference with religious practices, and deceit sufficiently state a claim if it fails to allege a causal connection to sale/advertisement, physical injury/property damage, or specific circumstances of fraud, respectively? 4. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by denying a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint when he did not file a motion to amend or specify proposed amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Zinter, Justice
Yes, federal civil rights claims against private actors are untimely if filed more than three years after the alleged constitutional deprivation occurred. Sisney's federal claims against Best were filed on May 14, 2007, more than four years after Best's contract ended on July 31, 2002. Sisney's reliance on SDCL 15-2-3 (tolling for fraud) is misplaced because he did not seek relief based upon fraud in connection with his constitutional claims under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985. No, a complaint for federal civil rights violations (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985) against non-state actors does not sufficiently state a claim if it fails to allege facts suggesting an unconstitutional state policy or custom, or a mutual understanding for a conspiracy, without specific factual support. For the § 1983 claim, Sisney failed to plead that the non-state actors (CBM and Preyer) acted pursuant to an unconstitutional state policy or custom, lacking any factual allegations or language from which such an inference could be drawn. For the § 1985 conspiracy claim, Sisney failed to allege any facts necessary to infer a "meeting of minds" or mutual understanding, merely using the word "conspiracy" without factual support; the alleged conspiracy between Preyer and CBM, his corporate employer, is also barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. No, a complaint for state law claims of deceptive trade practices and interference with religious practices does not sufficiently state a claim if it fails to allege a causal connection to sale/advertisement or physical injury/property damage, respectively. Sisney's claim under SDCL 37-24-6 and 37-24-31 for deceptive trade practices fails because he did not acquire the bread in connection with Best’s or CBM’s practices in their sale or advertisement of food services, as he received it as an inmate from the DOC. His claims under SDCL 22-19B-4 (a criminal statute with no private right of enforcement) and SDCL 20-9-32 (requires physical injury or property damage not alleged by Sisney) for interference with religious practices also fail. Yes, a complaint for deceit under SDCL 20-10-1 sufficiently states a claim if it pleads specific factual averments of misrepresentation and intent, even if the facts are doubtful. Sisney's complaint specifically pleaded that Best and CBM represented the bread as certified kosher, that he was continually assured it was kosher, that Preyer’s affidavit contradicted these assurances, and that Sisney consumed non-kosher bread because of this deceit. These specific factual averments, combined with permissible general allegations of intent or knowledge under SDCL 15-6-9(b), state a plausible claim for deceit. No, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint when he did not file a motion to amend or specify proposed amendments. Sisney only generally raised the issue of amendment in a brief resisting dismissal and did not provide specific factual allegations he would add to cure the deficiencies. The South Dakota Supreme Court adopted the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly standard for motions to dismiss, requiring factual allegations to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and move beyond "labels and conclusions." The Court affirmed the dismissal of federal claims as untimely (Best) or insufficiently pleaded (CBM/Preyer). It also affirmed dismissal of state deceptive trade practices and religious interference claims. However, it reversed the dismissal of the deceit claim, finding Sisney's allegations specific enough to satisfy pleading requirements for fraud under SDCL 15-6-9(b) when viewed favorably to the pleader.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant in South Dakota jurisprudence as it formally adopts the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 'plausibility' pleading standard, replacing the more lenient Conley v. Gibson 'no set of facts' standard. This shift imposes a higher bar for plaintiffs, requiring complaints to move beyond mere legal conclusions and provide sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate a plausible claim for relief. This will likely lead to more motions to dismiss at the pleading stage and demand greater specificity from plaintiffs, particularly in civil rights and fraud cases, ensuring that claims are grounded in factual support rather than speculation.
