Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
266 F.3d 186 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3), an amended complaint adding a new defendant after the statute of limitations has run will not relate back if the new defendant did not receive sufficient notice within 120 days of the original filing. Notice cannot be imputed via the 'shared attorney' method if the attorney was retained after the 120-day period, nor via the 'identity of interest' method if the defendant is a non-management employee who does not share a sufficient nexus of interests with their employer.
Facts:
- Edward Singletary was an inmate serving a sentence at the State Correctional Institute at Rockview (SCI-Rockview).
- In November 1995, Singletary was transferred to a maximum security restricted housing unit after threatening an employee.
- Over the next ten months, Singletary's mental state deteriorated; he became increasingly agitated and paranoid, but refused to take prescribed anti-psychotic medication.
- On October 3, 1996, Singletary threatened a prison officer.
- On October 4, 1996, he was transferred to a disciplinary cell and was separately evaluated by a consultant psychiatrist, Kevin Burke, and a staff psychologist, Robert Regan.
- Singletary denied to both Burke and Regan that he was suicidal, and neither saw a reason to take further precautions.
- Just after midnight on October 6, 1996, Edward Singletary committed suicide by hanging himself with a bedsheet in his cell.
Procedural Posture:
- Dorothy Singletary, as administrator of her son's estate, filed a § 1983 civil rights lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PADOC), SCI-Rockview, Superintendent Joseph Mazurkiewicz, and 'Unknown Corrections Officers' in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
- The action was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
- The District Court dismissed the claims against PADOC and SCI-Rockview on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.
- Following discovery, Singletary (plaintiff) filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add psychologist Robert Regan as a named defendant.
- The District Court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend, ruling that the claim against Regan was barred by the statute of limitations because it did not meet the 'relation back' requirements of Rule 15(c)(3).
- The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Mazurkiewicz.
- Dorothy Singletary (Appellant) appealed the denial of her motion to amend and the grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's amended complaint, which substitutes a named individual for a 'John Doe' defendant after the statute of limitations has expired, relate back to the original filing date under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) when the newly-named defendant is a non-management employee who did not receive actual notice of the suit within 120 days?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker, Chief Judge
No. The amended complaint does not relate back to the original filing date because the plaintiff fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3)(A). Rule 15(c)(3) requires that the newly-named party receive notice of the action within 120 days of the original complaint's filing. The plaintiff argues for imputed notice through two methods, both of which fail. First, the 'shared attorney' method is inapplicable because the defendants' counsel was not assigned to the case until after the 120-day notice period had expired. Second, the 'identity of interest' method fails because Regan, as a non-management staff psychologist, did not share a sufficient nexus of interests with his employer, SCI-Rockview, such that notice to the institution could be imputed to him. Because the plaintiff cannot satisfy the notice requirement, the court does not need to resolve the more complex issue of whether a lack of knowledge constitutes a 'mistake' under Rule 15(c)(3)(B).
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and narrows the application of imputed notice under Rule 15(c)(3) in the Third Circuit. It establishes that the 'identity of interest' between an employee and their government employer is not automatic and depends on the employee's role, holding that non-management employees generally lack the required nexus for notice imputation. The opinion is also significant for its extensive dicta criticizing the majority circuit view that filing a 'John Doe' complaint is not a 'mistake,' highlighting a circuit split and advocating for a rule change to prevent inequitable outcomes for civil rights plaintiffs who cannot immediately identify their assailants.
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