Singer v. United States
380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (1965)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute constitutional right to a bench trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), which conditions a defendant's waiver of a jury trial on the consent of the government and the approval of the court, is a reasonable procedure and does not violate the Constitution.
Facts:
- Petitioner Singer was indicted on 30 counts of mail fraud.
- The indictment alleged that Singer used the mail to defraud amateur songwriters by taking money to market their songs.
- On the opening day of trial, Singer offered in writing to waive his right to a jury trial.
- Singer's stated reason for the waiver was to shorten the trial.
- The trial court was willing to approve the waiver.
- The Government (the prosecution) refused to consent to the waiver.
- As a result of the government's refusal, Singer was tried by a jury.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Singer was charged in a federal district court (court of first instance).
- The jury convicted Singer on 29 of the 30 counts.
- Singer (as appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Singer's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does conditioning a federal criminal defendant's waiver of a jury trial on the consent of the prosecution and the approval of the court, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), violate the defendant's constitutional rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
No, conditioning a defendant's waiver of a jury trial on the consent of the government and the court does not violate the Constitution. The history of the jury trial right, from English common law through the colonial period, shows it was established as a protection for the accused against government oppression, not as an option between two modes of trial. The Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial but does not confer a correlative right to demand a trial by a judge alone. Citing precedent from Patton v. United States, the Court affirmed that while a jury trial can be waived, its waiver can be conditioned on the consent of both the prosecution and the court. The ability to waive a constitutional right does not create a right to insist upon its opposite, and the government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in having cases tried before a jury, which the Constitution deems the 'normal and preferable mode' of determining guilt.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is a right of the accused, but not a right that gives the accused the unilateral power to choose the mode of trial. It firmly upholds the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), granting the prosecution a veto over a defendant's request for a bench trial. This prevents defendants from strategically opting for a bench trial to avoid an unsympathetic jury or to select a judge they perceive as more favorable, thereby preserving the jury's central role in the criminal justice system. The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that in circumstances where 'passion, prejudice... public feeling' make an impartial jury impossible, the government's refusal to consent might result in the denial of a fair trial.
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