Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co.
27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975), 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A communication from a former employer to a new or prospective employer regarding a former employee is conditionally privileged, but this privilege is lost if the plaintiff presents evidence from which a jury could infer malice. The constitutional 'actual malice' standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny does not apply to purely private defamation actions.
Facts:
- Jack Sindorf was employed as a salesman by the Pennsylvania-based Jacron corporation for 18 months.
- Sindorf resigned on July 23, 1973, following a dispute over sales commissions he believed were due to him.
- Upon resigning, Sindorf retained company inventory, stating in a letter that he would return it upon payment of the commissions.
- A few days later, the Tool Box Corporation of Maryland, headed by William Brose, hired Sindorf.
- John Langton, president of the Pennsylvania Jacron, learned of Sindorf's new employment and asked Robert Fridkis, Vice President of its Virginia-based subsidiary (Jacron), to contact Brose.
- Fridkis called Tool Box and first spoke with a secretary, Denise Bennett, telling her 'we have some things missing and I would like to talk to Bill about Jack,' which led Bennett to believe Sindorf was a thief.
- Fridkis then spoke with Brose, stating that with Sindorf 'there was quite a few cash sales and quite a bit of merchandise that was not accounted for,' that Sindorf had been 'fired,' and that Brose should 'watch your stock real, real carefully.'
- Brose recorded the conversation and subsequently informed Sindorf about what Fridkis had said.
Procedural Posture:
- Jack Sindorf sued Jacron Sales Co., Inc. (Jacron) and its employee, Robert Fridkis, for slander in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, a state trial court.
- The trial court dismissed Fridkis from the action prior to trial for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- The case against Jacron proceeded to a jury trial.
- At the close of all evidence, the trial judge granted Jacron's motion for a directed verdict.
- The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Jacron.
- Sindorf, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the state's intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a company whose agent makes defamatory statements about a former employee to that employee's new employer lose its conditional privilege if there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer malice, such as by excessive publication, improper purpose, or a reckless disregard for the truth?
Opinions:
Majority - Orth, C. J.
Yes. A defendant's conditional privilege to make defamatory statements is defeated if there is sufficient evidence of malice for the issue to go to the jury. Here, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant because reasonable minds could differ on whether the privilege was abused. The court reasoned that a conditional privilege exists when the communicating party and the recipient have a mutual interest, such as a former and current employer discussing an employee. However, this privilege is defeasible if the plaintiff shows malice, which means a reckless disregard for the truth, use of unnecessarily abusive language, or motivation by ill-will. Evidence of malice could be inferred from Fridkis's unsolicited statements, his excessive publication to the secretary, his false assertion that Sindorf was fired, his failure to mention Sindorf's reason for holding the inventory, and a potential improper purpose to pressure Sindorf. The court also conducted a detailed analysis of First Amendment defamation law, concluding that the heightened 'actual malice' standard from Gertz v. Welch, Inc. applies only to defamation involving matters of public interest and not to purely private disputes like this one.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the common law doctrine of conditional privilege in the context of employer references while clarifying the jury's essential role in determining whether the privilege was abused through malice. It establishes that a plaintiff can defeat a motion for a directed verdict by presenting credible evidence from which a jury could infer malice, such as excessive publication, improper motive, or recklessness. Most significantly, the court's opinion distinguishes common law malice from the constitutional 'actual malice' standard, holding that the heightened First Amendment protections articulated in Gertz v. Welch, Inc. do not extend to purely private defamation cases, thereby preserving the application of traditional state tort law in such disputes.
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