Simmons v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
120 F.3d 664, 1997 WL 392717 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a federal agency preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) cannot define the project's purpose so narrowly as to foreclose consideration of a range of reasonable alternatives. The agency must independently define the project's underlying purpose and cannot simply adopt an applicant's self-serving, narrow definition.
Facts:
- The City of Marion, Illinois, needed a new source of water because its existing lake provided an insufficient quantity of poor-quality water.
- The nearby Lake of Egypt Water District also required a new water source, as its supply was limited and controlled by a third-party electric cooperative.
- To address both shortages, Marion proposed building a dam on Sugar Creek, a free-flowing stream, to create a new reservoir called Sugar Creek Lake.
- Marion intended for this new lake to serve as a single water source for both itself and the Water District.
- Construction of the dam required a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) under the Clean Water Act.
- The proposed dam would flood a significant area of wetlands, woods, and farms, destroying habitats for several species.
- A potential alternative to the dam project involved Marion connecting to an existing pipeline from Rend Lake, which was closer to Marion than the proposed Sugar Creek Lake.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Marion applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for a permit to build a dam.
- Initially, the Corps completed an 'environmental assessment' and concluded the project would have no significant environmental impact.
- A group of landowners and the Sierra Club (Plaintiffs) sued the Corps in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
- The district court (Judge Foreman) ruled for the Plaintiffs, finding the Corps' decision arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the Corps to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
- The Corps completed the EIS and subsequently re-issued the permit to Marion.
- The Plaintiffs sued the Corps again in the same federal district court.
- On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court (Chief Judge Gilbert) granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps and Marion.
- The Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a federal agency violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by defining a project's purpose so narrowly—based on the applicant's proposal—that it fails to consider an entire category of reasonable alternatives in its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)?
Opinions:
Majority - Cudahy, Circuit Judge
Yes. A federal agency violates NEPA when it constricts the definition of a project’s purpose to such a degree that it excludes truly reasonable alternatives from consideration in an Environmental Impact Statement. The heart of an EIS is the analysis of alternatives, which depends on a properly defined project purpose. The agency cannot simply defer to the applicant's definition of purpose but must exercise independent judgment to define the project's underlying goal from a public perspective. In this case, the Corps improperly adopted Marion's narrow purpose of creating a single water source for two entities, which foreclosed consideration of separate-source alternatives. The court reasoned that a common problem (water shortages for two entities) does not necessitate a common solution, and the existence of a viable but unexamined alternative, such as using water from the existing Rend Lake, rendered the EIS inadequate.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the procedural requirements of NEPA, specifically the 'hard look' doctrine concerning the evaluation of alternatives. It serves as a crucial check on agency deference to project applicants, preventing them from 'defining away' reasonable alternatives by narrowly framing a project's purpose. The ruling establishes that the 'purpose and need' section of an EIS is not a mere formality but a substantive standard that dictates the scope of the entire environmental review. This precedent places a clear duty on agencies to independently question and define a project's underlying goals to ensure a robust and legally defensible analysis of all reasonable courses of action.
