Siegert v. Gilley
500 U.S. 226 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Before determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity based on whether a constitutional right was 'clearly established,' a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right at all. Reputational damage from alleged defamation by a government official, even when it impairs future employment prospects, does not by itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Facts:
- Frederick A. Siegert was a clinical psychologist employed at St. Elizabeths Hospital, a federal facility.
- H. Melvyn Gilley became Siegert's supervisor.
- Facing termination for performance issues, Siegert voluntarily resigned from St. Elizabeths.
- Siegert later secured a position at a U.S. Army hospital in Germany, which required him to be 'credentialed.'
- As part of the credentialing process, Siegert requested that St. Elizabeths provide information about his job performance to his new supervisor.
- In response, Gilley sent a letter stating he considered Siegert to be 'inept and unethical, perhaps the least trustworthy individual' he had ever supervised.
- As a result of Gilley's letter, the Army recommended against credentialing Siegert.
- Subsequently, Siegert's federal employment was terminated and he was unable to obtain other appropriate employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Siegert filed a Bivens action against Gilley in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
- Gilley filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity.
- The District Court denied Gilley's motion and ordered limited discovery to proceed.
- Gilley, the appellant, filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with Siegert as appellee.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Siegert, the appellee, had failed to satisfy a 'heightened pleading standard' for alleging the malice required to overcome qualified immunity.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a government official's allegedly defamatory negative job reference, which harms a former employee's future employment prospects, violate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No, a government official's allegedly defamatory negative job reference that harms future employment prospects does not violate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The initial inquiry in a qualified immunity case is whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. Citing Paul v. Davis, the Court held that injury to reputation by itself is not a 'liberty' interest protected by the Constitution. While the statements in Gilley's letter were damaging and impaired Siegert's employment prospects, this harm flows from the injury to his reputation, which is a tort actionable under state law, not a constitutional deprivation. The alleged defamation was not connected to the termination of Siegert's employment, as he had already voluntarily resigned, making this a pure defamation claim rather than a 'stigma-plus' claim that would implicate a liberty interest.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, Gilley's letter did violate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The majority improperly decided an issue that was not granted certiorari. Substantively, Paul v. Davis holds that injury to reputation combined with the impairment of a more tangible government benefit, such as the loss of government employment, does constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Gilley's letter, which effectively foreclosed Siegert's eligibility for future government employment, satisfies this 'stigma-plus' test. This right was clearly established at the time by precedent in the D.C. Circuit, meaning Gilley should not have been entitled to qualified immunity. The dissent also criticizes the Court of Appeals' 'heightened pleading' standard as an unwarranted barrier for plaintiffs.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No, but the case should be decided on other grounds. While agreeing with the majority's analytical framework that a court must first find a constitutional violation, Justice Kennedy would have affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. He reasoned that Siegert failed to meet the 'heightened pleading standard' necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense when malice is an element of the claim. In such cases, a plaintiff must put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations of malice. Because Siegert's allegations were merely conclusory, his claim was properly dismissed on qualified immunity grounds without needing to reach the difficult constitutional question.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing the mandatory analytical sequence for qualified immunity claims. It requires courts to first resolve the threshold question of whether a plaintiff has even stated a violation of a constitutional right before proceeding to the question of whether that right was 'clearly established.' This 'Siegert sequencing' allows for earlier dismissal of weak constitutional claims, protecting government officials from the burdens of discovery and litigation. The decision also narrowly construes the 'stigma-plus' test from Paul v. Davis, reinforcing that reputational harm alone, even when causing tangible economic loss like the inability to find a job, does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.
Unlock the full brief for Siegert v. Gilley