No. The search of Sibron was illegal because the officer had no reason to believe he was armed. Just talking to certain people isn't enough. The officer also went straight for Sibron's pocket to find drugs, not to check for a weapon. However, the search of Peters was legal. Peters was acting so suspiciously and then ran away, which gave the officer enough reason to arrest him. A search after a legal arrest is allowed.

Yes, the majority is right. Just hanging out with addicts doesn't make you a criminal who can be searched. But Peters was clearly acting like a burglar, so his search was fine.

Yes, the search of Peters was okay, but not because of an arrest. It was a legal 'stop and frisk' because the cop had good reason to be suspicious of him.

Yes, the results are right, but the logic is off. The cop had no reason even to stop Sibron, so the search was definitely illegal. For Peters, the cop didn't have enough to arrest him, but he had enough suspicion to do a legal 'stop and frisk' for safety.

I disagree about Sibron. When Sibron reached for his pocket, the cop had every reason to think he might have a gun and was right to search him to stay safe. The search was legal.

The Court said the search of Sibron was unconstitutional because the officer didn't have a good reason to think Sibron had committed a crime or that he was armed and dangerous. Just talking to drug users isn't enough of a reason. But the Court said the search of Peters was okay, because the officer had good reasons to think Peters was trying to break into an apartment and to arrest him, so searching him was allowed.

Justice Douglas agreed that just talking to drug users doesn't give police a good reason to search someone. He said if that was enough, it would mean a lot of people wouldn't be protected by the Fourth Amendment.

For Peters' case, Justice Douglas agreed the officer had good reason to think Peters was trying to break in somewhere, so arresting and searching him was fine.

Justice White agreed with the outcome, but thought there were good reasons for the officer to stop and quickly search Peters for weapons, even if there wasn't quite enough reason to arrest him at first.

Justice Fortas agreed with the Court, but said a law could potentially be unconstitutional all the time if it allowed searches that clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. He also said the Court should have accepted when the government lawyers admitted they were wrong in Sibron's case.

Justice Harlan agreed with the end result, but thought the Court should have said more about whether New York's stop-and-frisk law was constitutional in general, not just in these specific cases. He didn't think the officer had good reason to forcibly stop Sibron. But he also disagreed that the officer had enough reason to arrest Peters at first, though he still thought stopping and searching Peters was justified.

Justice Black agreed with the Court about Peters, but disagreed about Sibron. He thought the officer had reason to believe Sibron might have been reaching for a weapon, and that after finding drugs, the officer had cause to arrest Sibron. He said the Court was wrongly second-guessing the facts found by the lower courts.

" `[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person

—a companion case to Terry, the Court considered whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous, so as to justify the officer's self-protective search for weapons.

"The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case."

"The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal security."

T] t is an `obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences

"The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts …

"The officer must be able `to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.'"

"[A] criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction."

—deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest

Confessions of error are, of course, entitled to and given great weight, but they do not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function

Yes. A search for weapons lacks constitutional justification and exceeds its permissible scope if it is not based on a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and dangerous and is not limited to a protective pat-down. In Sibron's case, the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe Sibron was armed and dangerous simply because he was talking to known narcotics addicts. The officer's statement, 'You know what I am after,' and his immediate intrusion into Sibron's pocket without a preliminary pat-down, demonstrate that the search was an impermissible general exploratory search for narcotics, not a limited frisk for weapons. In Peters' case, however, the search was constitutional as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The officer had probable cause to arrest Peters for attempted burglary based on his furtive behavior and flight, and the subsequent search for weapons and evidence was therefore justified.

Yes. In Sibron's case, the officer's actions were unconstitutional. Merely talking with known addicts rises no higher than suspicion and does not provide a basis for a seizure and search. In Peters' case, the search was constitutional because at the time the officer seized him, he had probable cause to believe Peters was engaged in a burglary, which justified the seizure and a limited search.

Yes. The search of Peters was justified, but on the grounds that there was probable cause to stop him for questioning and frisk him for dangerous weapons, as established in Terry v. Ohio, not because there was probable cause for a full arrest.

Yes. Joins the majority's constitutional analysis but would explicitly reserve the possibility that a statute authorizing warrantless searches could be unconstitutional 'on its face.' He also would have accepted the State's confession of error regarding Sibron's conviction.

Yes. While agreeing with the results, the Court should have analyzed both cases under the Terry v. Ohio framework. In Sibron's case, the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion required even to initiate a 'stop,' making the subsequent frisk illegal. In Peters' case, the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest but did have sufficient reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk, which made the discovery of the tools constitutional.

No, as to Sibron. The search of Sibron was justified. When Sibron, after associating with addicts for hours, reached into his pocket upon being confronted by the officer, it was reasonable for the officer to believe he might be reaching for a weapon, justifying a search for self-protection. Furthermore, the officer had probable cause to believe Sibron was committing a felony narcotics offense.

The Court held that the search of Sibron was unconstitutional because Patrolman Martin lacked probable cause to arrest Sibron and did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was armed and dangerous. The mere act of talking with narcotics addicts was not enough to justify the intrusion. The Court emphasized that the officer must be able to point to specific facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous. Furthermore, even if the frisk was justified, the scope of Patrolman Martin's search exceeded what was necessary for a protective pat-down for weapons. In contrast, the Court upheld the search in Peters' case, finding that Officer Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters by the time he caught up with him on the stairway based on his observations of Peters' suspicious behavior in the apartment building. The search was therefore a valid search incident to arrest.

Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment for Sibron, emphasizing that mere association with narcotics addicts does not give rise to probable cause for a search or seizure. He stated that if such association was sufficient, it would leave a large group of people effectively without Fourth Amendment protection.

In a separate concurrence for Peters, Justice Douglas agreed there was probable cause to believe Peters was attempting a burglary, justifying his arrest and the search incident to arrest.

Justice White concurred in the result, stating that while he did not believe there was probable cause to arrest Peters, there was probable cause to stop him for questioning and frisk him for weapons under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio.

Justice Fortas concurred, but noted that a statute could potentially be found unconstitutional on its face if it purported to authorize plainly unconstitutional searches. He also stated that the Court should accept the confession of error by the Kings County District Attorney's office in Sibron's case.

Justice Harlan concurred in the result, but disagreed with the Court's approach. He felt the Court should have more fully addressed the constitutionality of New York's stop-and-frisk law and not focused solely on the particular circumstances of each case. He agreed that the search in Sibron was not justified, as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a forcible stop. However, he felt the Court erred in finding probable cause for Peters' arrest, and would have instead found the stop and frisk justified under the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion.

Justice Black concurred in the affirmance of Peters' conviction, but dissented from the reversal in Sibron's case. He believed there was probable cause to think Sibron might be reaching for a weapon when he moved his hand toward his pocket, and that after finding the heroin, there was probable cause to arrest him for narcotics violations. He criticized the majority for substituting its own factual findings for those of the state courts.

Sibron v. New York

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Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

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