Sherrod v. Berry
856 F.2d 802, 1988 WL 92583 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
The reasonableness of a police officer's use of deadly force under the Fourth Amendment must be judged exclusively from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, based on the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment the force was used. Evidence discovered after the fact, such as that the suspect was unarmed, is irrelevant and inadmissible to determine the reasonableness of the officer's actions.
Facts:
- On December 8, 1979, a police radio dispatch reported a robbery at a gift shop in Joliet, Illinois, and provided a description of the suspect.
- Joliet Police Officer Willie Berry believed the description matched Gary Duckworth, a known suspect in other assaultive crimes.
- Officer Berry and his partner observed Duckworth as a passenger in a car driven by Ronald Sherrod near the crime scene.
- The officers initiated a traffic stop, and believing the suspects were armed and dangerous, they drew their weapons.
- After the occupants, Sherrod and Duckworth, complied with an order to raise their hands on the third command, Officer Berry approached the vehicle.
- Berry observed Sherrod make a 'quick movement with his hand into his coat,' which he perceived as reaching for a weapon.
- In response to this perceived threat, Officer Berry shot and killed Sherrod.
- A subsequent search of Sherrod's body and vehicle revealed that he was unarmed.
Procedural Posture:
- Lucien Sherrod, the decedent's father, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Officer Berry and the City of Joliet in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- At trial, the district court judge admitted evidence that Ronald Sherrod was unarmed at the time of the shooting, over the defendants' objections.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $1,601,700 in damages.
- The defendants-appellants appealed the verdict to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- An original three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
- The Seventh Circuit subsequently vacated the panel decision and granted a rehearing en banc to reconsider the case.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, when applied to a police officer's use of deadly force, permit the admission of evidence that the suspect was unarmed, a fact unknown to the officer at the moment of the shooting?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Coffey
No. The Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard requires that an officer's use of force be evaluated based exclusively upon the information the officer possessed immediately prior to and at the very moment the force was used. Knowledge of facts and circumstances gained after the fact, such as that the suspect was unarmed, is irrelevant and prejudicial. The jury must stand in the officer's shoes and judge the reasonableness of the action based only on the information available to the officer in that split second. Admitting evidence that Sherrod was unarmed improperly allows the jury to use 20/20 hindsight, which is contrary to the standard established in cases like Tennessee v. Garner and Davis v. Freels, where an officer's reasonable but mistaken belief in danger can still justify the use of deadly force. Such evidence may only be admissible for impeachment if an officer testifies to seeing a weapon, but here, Berry only testified to seeing a furtive movement, which the lack of a weapon does not contradict.
Dissenting - Judge Cummings
Yes. The evidence that the suspect was unarmed is relevant and should be admitted. The majority's view of 'under the circumstances' is too narrow and ignores the 'totality of the circumstances' standard, which allows for consideration of all relevant facts. Evidence that Sherrod was unarmed is relevant for two reasons: 1) it helps the jury evaluate the conflicting testimony about the nature of Sherrod's movement, making it less probable that his movement was as threatening as the officer claimed, and 2) it is relevant for impeachment because it detracts from the credibility of the officer's testimony about the reasonableness of his fear. Furthermore, the district court's decision should only be reversed for a clear abuse of discretion, which was not shown here. The defendants also waived their argument that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial by failing to object on that specific ground at trial.
Dissenting - Judge Flaum
Yes, the evidence was relevant, but the verdict should stand for other reasons. Under the broad standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence that Sherrod was unarmed was relevant because it could help the jury assess witness credibility regarding Sherrod's movement. However, this relevant evidence was highly prejudicial and likely should have been excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Crucially, the defendants failed to object on the specific ground of prejudice at trial, thereby waiving the issue for appeal. Because the only preserved objection was for relevance, which the district court correctly decided, the jury's verdict should be affirmed.
Concurring - Judge Ripple
Yes. The evidence regarding whether the suspect was armed was admissible. While I concur in the judgment to reverse and remand for a new trial, I do so on the grounds of improper jury instructions, not the evidentiary ruling. On the issue of admitting evidence that Sherrod was unarmed, I agree with the reasoning of Judge Cummings's dissent that such evidence was relevant and admissible.
Analysis:
This case establishes a strict evidentiary framework for § 1983 excessive force claims, mandating a 'snapshot' analysis of an officer's conduct. By excluding information discovered after the fact, the court significantly shields officers from liability based on 20/20 hindsight, focusing the inquiry solely on the officer's perception at the moment of the incident. This decision reinforces the principle that a reasonable but mistaken belief of imminent danger can justify deadly force. It clarifies the 'objective reasonableness' standard by strictly limiting the 'circumstances' a jury can consider, making it potentially more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in cases where a perceived threat is later proven to be non-existent.
