Sherrer v. Sherrer
1948 U.S. LEXIS 2080, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1429, 334 U.S. 343 (1948)
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Rule of Law:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution bars a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in a sister state if the defendant participated in the divorce proceedings and was accorded a full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues.
Facts:
- Margaret E. Sherrer and Edward C. Sherrer were married and lived together in Monterey, Massachusetts from 1932 until 1944.
- Following marital discord, Margaret Sherrer took the couple's two children and moved to Florida on April 3, 1944, telling Edward it was for a vacation.
- Shortly after arriving, she informed Edward she did not intend to return, secured housing, enrolled their older child in school, and obtained employment.
- An acquaintance from Massachusetts, Henry A. Phelps, also moved to Florida shortly after Margaret's arrival.
- On December 1, 1944, the day after her divorce was finalized, Margaret married Phelps in Florida.
- In February 1945, Margaret and Phelps returned to Massachusetts to live.
Procedural Posture:
- Margaret Sherrer filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of Florida, a court of first instance.
- Edward Sherrer retained Florida counsel who entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegation of Margaret's Florida residence.
- Edward Sherrer personally appeared at the Florida divorce hearing to testify regarding a child custody stipulation.
- The Florida court entered a final decree of divorce, specifically finding it had jurisdiction. Edward did not appeal this decree in the Florida courts.
- Edward Sherrer later filed a petition in the Probate Court of Berkshire County, Massachusetts, seeking a declaration that the Florida divorce was invalid.
- The Massachusetts Probate Court found that Margaret had never been domiciled in Florida and granted relief to Edward.
- On appeal by Margaret Sherrer, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the state's highest court) affirmed the Probate Court's decree.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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Issue:
Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution preclude a person from collaterally attacking a divorce decree from a sister state on jurisdictional grounds, if that person appeared and participated in the original divorce proceedings?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
Yes. The Full Faith and Credit Clause bars a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where the defendant participated in the divorce proceedings. The Court held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to jurisdictional findings when a party has had a full opportunity to litigate the issue. Respondent Edward Sherrer had his day in court in Florida; he retained counsel, filed an answer denying petitioner's domicile, and personally appeared. He was afforded procedural due process and had the opportunity to contest the jurisdictional facts, but failed to do so effectively. Allowing a collateral attack after such participation would endlessly prolong litigation and undermine the finality of judgments, contrary to the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a state from re-examining the jurisdictional basis of a sister state's divorce decree, as the state of domicile has a profound interest in the marital status of its citizens that cannot be foreclosed by a collusive or feigned contest between the parties. The dissent argued that marriage is not a private contract but a social institution in which the state has a vital interest. Allowing parties to evade the laws of their home state through a temporary move and a sham legal proceeding in a state with lax divorce laws undermines the domiciliary state's public policy. The majority's holding, in effect, allows states with the most lenient divorce laws to impose their policies on all others, creating a 'Gresham’s Law of domestic relations.'
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthened the finality of divorce decrees and limited the ability of states to refuse recognition of out-of-state divorces. It established that the principle of res judicata bars a collateral attack on a divorce court's jurisdiction if the defendant appeared in the original proceeding. This ruling effectively carves out a major exception to the doctrine from Williams v. North Carolina (II), which permitted collateral attacks on ex parte divorce decrees. By prioritizing procedural participation over the substantive truth of domicile, Sherrer provided greater certainty for divorced individuals but also made it easier for parties to obtain 'migratory divorces' by creating a record of a contested proceeding, even if the contest was not genuine.
