Sherman Ex Rel. Sherman v. Koch
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21266, 2010 WL 4026812, 623 F.3d 501 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A state law mandating a brief period of silence in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause, even if it explicitly mentions 'silent prayer' as a permissible activity, provided the law has a genuine secular purpose and does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
Facts:
- Since 1969, Illinois law permitted teachers to optionally observe a brief period of silence for 'silent prayer or for silent reflection.'
- In 2002, the Illinois legislature added a new section to the act codifying students' rights to non-disruptive prayer and freedom from state-sponsored religion.
- At the same time in 2002, the act's title was changed from the 'Silent Reflection Act' to the 'Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act.'
- In 2007, the legislature amended the act to make the period of silence mandatory, changing the statutory language from 'may observe' to 'shall observe.'
- Then-Governor Rod Blagojevich vetoed the 2007 amendment.
- The Illinois legislature overrode the governor's veto, and the amendment became effective on October 11, 2007.
- Dawn Sherman was a public high school student in Illinois subject to this mandatory period of silence.
Procedural Posture:
- Dawn Sherman sued Christopher Koch, the Illinois Superintendent of Education, and her school district in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- Sherman sought a declaration that the mandatory moment of silence law was facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The district court certified a plaintiff class of all Illinois public school students and a defendant class of all Illinois public school districts.
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Sherman, finding the law violated the Establishment Clause and was unconstitutionally vague.
- The district court entered a permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of the law.
- Christopher Koch, the defendant, appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, which mandates a brief period of silence at the start of each school day for 'silent prayer or for silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day,' violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Manion, J.
No, the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act does not violate the Establishment Clause. The court analyzed the statute under the three-prong Lemon test. First, the statute has a valid secular purpose: providing a uniform moment of quiet reflection to calm schoolchildren before they start their day. Unlike in Wallace v. Jaffree, where the sole purpose was to return prayer to schools, the legislative history here supports the secular purpose, and the statute explicitly states the period 'shall not be conducted as a religious exercise.' Second, the statute's principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; it merely mandates silence, not prayer, and is neutral between religious and non-religious introspection. Mentioning prayer as an option clarifies that it is permissible, rather than endorsing it. Third, the statute does not create an excessive government entanglement with religion, as it only requires teachers to ensure silence. The court also rejected the claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, finding it clear enough for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand.
Dissenting - Williams, J.
Yes, the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act violates the Establishment Clause. The dissent argues that the Act's stated secular purpose is a pretext for its actual religious purpose of promoting prayer in schools. The inclusion of the word 'prayer' was unnecessary to achieve the secular goal of calming students, especially since an optional moment of silence already existed. The dissent contends that the Act's primary effect is to endorse religion by providing a forced, binary choice between 'silent prayer' and 'silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.' Unlike other upheld statutes that included a broad catch-all phrase like 'any other silent activity,' this Act impermissibly elevates prayer as a state-favored option, thus conveying a message of endorsement that violates the Establishment Clause.
Analysis:
This decision aligns the Seventh Circuit with the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in upholding moment of silence statutes post-Wallace v. Jaffree. It reinforces the principle that a statute's mention of 'prayer' is not per se unconstitutional if a plausible secular purpose is present and prayer is not presented as the only or superior option. The ruling emphasizes judicial deference to a legislature's stated secular purpose unless there is clear evidence it is a sham. This case provides a roadmap for states wishing to enact such statutes, suggesting that framing the purpose around pedagogical goals like improving student focus can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
