Sheridan v. United States
1988 U.S. LEXIS 2873, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 101 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
The intentional tort exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not bar a claim against the government when the claim arises from the negligence of government employees who breach an independent duty of care, even if the ultimate injury is caused by an assault or battery committed by another government employee who was not acting within the scope of their employment.
Facts:
- An off-duty naval medical aide, Carr, consumed a large quantity of alcoholic beverages at the Bethesda Naval Hospital.
- Carr then packed his belongings, including a rifle and ammunition, into a bag and left his quarters.
- Three on-duty naval corpsmen found Carr lying face down in a drunken stupor on a hospital building floor.
- When the corpsmen attempted to take Carr to the emergency room, he broke away, revealing the barrel of the rifle from his bag.
- The corpsmen fled upon seeing the rifle and neither subdued Carr nor alerted the appropriate authorities that he was heavily intoxicated and armed.
- Later that evening, Carr fired several shots from the rifle into a car being driven by the Sheridans on a public street near the hospital.
- One of the Sheridans sustained physical injuries, and their car was damaged.
Procedural Posture:
- The Sheridans (petitioners) brought suit against the United States (respondent) in U.S. District Court.
- The District Court granted the government's motion to dismiss the action, holding the claim was barred by the FTCA's intentional tort exception.
- The Sheridans appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits.
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Issue:
Does the intentional tort exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), bar a claim for injuries caused by an assault and battery committed by an off-duty government employee, when the claim is based on the independent negligence of other government employees in failing to prevent the attack?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The intentional tort exception to the FTCA does not bar a claim where the government's liability is based on its own negligence, which is entirely independent of the assailant's employment status. The Court reasons that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies to negligent acts of government employees acting within the scope of their employment. Here, the alleged negligence was that of the naval corpsmen who failed to act after discovering a visibly intoxicated and armed individual. This duty existed independent of Carr's status as a serviceman; the government would have had the same duty if Carr were a civilian visitor. Because neither Carr's employment status nor his intentional state of mind is relevant to the government's alleged breach of its independent duty of care, the claim does not 'arise out of' the assault in the manner contemplated by the § 2680(h) exception.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. The FTCA's intentional tort exception does not bar claims based on the independent negligence of the government, but it would bar claims based on negligent supervision of the employee-tortfeasor. A court must distinguish between negligence based on the employment relationship (e.g., negligent hiring or supervision), which is barred by § 2680(h), and negligence based on a separate duty independent of the employment relation (e.g., a 'Good Samaritan' duty to control a dangerous person on government property). In this case, the government's duty to control individuals on the naval base extended to everyone, not just employees, so a claim based on the breach of that duty is permissible and does not circumvent the exception.
Concurring - Justice White
No. This opinion notes a departure from a previous position in United States v. Shearer, stating that the Court's current opinion, which he joins, 'has the better of it.'
Dissenting - Justice O’Connor
Yes. The intentional tort exception should bar the claim because the statutory language 'any claim arising out of assault, battery' is sweeping and unqualified. The ordinary meaning of these words includes any case in which the battery is an essential element of the claim. To allow the claim to proceed by framing it in terms of negligence circumvents the clear intent of Congress to exclude such claims. The dissent argues that the majority misinterprets precedent and that the focus should be on the fact that the injury would not have occurred but for the battery, thus the claim necessarily 'arises out of' it, regardless of any antecedent negligence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the FTCA's intentional tort exception. It establishes that the government can be held liable for its own negligence even when the direct cause of injury is an intentional tort by an employee, provided the negligence is independent of the employment relationship. This creates a critical distinction between barred claims of 'negligent supervision' and permissible claims based on a breach of a separate duty of care owed to the public, such as the duty to control a foreseeably dangerous person on government premises. The ruling prevents the government from using the 'happenstance' that an assailant is on the federal payroll to escape liability that a private entity would face in similar circumstances.
