Shepherd v. Gardner Wholesale, Inc.
256 So. 2d 877, 288 Ala. 43, 1972 Ala. LEXIS 1174 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is liable for negligence if their actions are a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; their negligence need not be the sole proximate cause. For a plaintiff's contributory negligence to bar recovery, that negligence must be a proximate cause of their own injury.
Facts:
- Roxie Shepherd was a pedestrian walking on a public sidewalk.
- Gardner Wholesale, Inc. owned a business building that abutted the sidewalk.
- A concrete slab, which formed the foundation of the building, was raised three to four inches above the level of the sidewalk.
- Shepherd tripped over this raised concrete slab and suffered serious physical injuries.
- A factual dispute existed as to whether the slab extended onto the public sidewalk or was entirely on Gardner Wholesale's property.
- Shepherd suffered from failing vision due to cataracts in both of her eyes.
Procedural Posture:
- Roxie Shepherd sued Gardner Wholesale, Inc. in an Alabama trial court for negligence.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial against the sole remaining defendant, Gardner Wholesale, Inc.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Gardner Wholesale, Inc.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict.
- Shepherd filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Shepherd, as appellant, appealed the judgment and the denial of her motion to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction misstate the law if it requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of their injuries in order to recover?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McCall
Yes, such an instruction misstates the law, constituting reversible error. A defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of an injury to render the defendant liable; it is sufficient that their negligence, concurring with one or more other efficient causes, is a proximate cause of the injury. The trial court's instructions improperly required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's negligence was the 'sole proximate cause' of her injuries, which placed an undue and incorrect burden of proof upon her. The court reasoned that this instruction would incorrectly exonerate a negligent defendant if any other party's wrongful act also proximately caused the injury. Furthermore, the court found reversible error in another instruction regarding contributory negligence because it failed to hypothesize that the plaintiff's own negligence must have proximately contributed to her injury to act as a bar to recovery. An instruction that misstates a controlling principle of law, such as proximate cause, is a fatal defect that cannot be cured by other correct instructions, as it is impossible to know which contradictory instruction the jury followed.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms fundamental tort law principles regarding concurrent causation and contributory negligence. It clarifies that instructing a jury that a defendant's negligence must be the 'sole' proximate cause is a reversible error, as it misstates the plaintiff's burden of proof under the established doctrine of concurrent causation. The case also underscores that an instruction on contributory negligence is fatally defective if it omits the element of proximate cause. This ruling serves as a strong precedent against inaccurate or incomplete jury instructions on causation, emphasizing that such errors are not harmless and cannot be cured by other, correct parts of the charge.
