Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State
55 Del. 298, 187 A.2d 71, 5 Storey 298 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
In Delaware, sovereign immunity is a constitutionally established doctrine that can only be waived or limited by an act of the General Assembly (the legislative branch), not by judicial action or interpretation.
Facts:
- An administrator for several decedents initiated a wrongful death action.
- The lawsuit was filed against Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. and James Evans.
- Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. and James Evans subsequently sought to join the State of Delaware as a third-party defendant.
- They alleged that the State's Highway Department was negligent in its maintenance of the highway at the specific location of the accident.
- They contended that this alleged negligence by the State was the cause of the fatal accident.
Procedural Posture:
- An administrator brought a wrongful death action against Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. and James Evans in a trial court.
- Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. and James Evans (defendants) sought to make the State of Delaware a third-party defendant.
- The State of Delaware moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, asserting its defense of sovereign immunity.
- The trial court granted the State's motion, dismissing the State as a third-party defendant on the ground of sovereign immunity.
- Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. and James Evans (appellants) appealed the trial court's dismissal of the State to the Supreme Court of Delaware.
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Issue:
Does Article I, Section 9 of the Delaware Constitution, which states, "Suits may be brought against the state, according to such regulation as shall be made by law," inherently amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity that courts are empowered to regulate or establish rules for?
Opinions:
Majority - Wolcott, J.
No, Article I, Section 9 of the Delaware Constitution does not, by itself, constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity that courts can regulate. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Delaware is not a judicially created principle but is firmly established by the State's Constitution. Historically, the common law doctrine of immunity for the sovereign was incorporated into Delaware's first Constitution of 1776 (Article 25) and subsequently continued through the Constitutions of 1792, 1831, and the present one (Article I, Section 9). The court reasoned that the phrase "according to such regulation as shall be made by law" explicitly grants the authority to waive or limit sovereign immunity solely to the legislative branch, the General Assembly. The original 1776 provision expressly limited this right to the Legislative Branch, and subsequent retention of similar language did not imply an expansion of this power to the Judicial Branch. The court also noted that the practical construction of this constitutional provision has been consistent with this view, as evidenced by past legislative enactments (e.g., 18 Del. C. § 516 and a 1956 special act) that specifically waived or limited sovereign immunity. While recognizing that the application of this doctrine might lead to unjust outcomes for injured parties, the court maintained that it is bound to apply the law as written, and that policy decisions regarding sovereign immunity are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the source and method of waiver for sovereign immunity in Delaware, firmly placing this power within the legislative domain and away from judicial discretion. It reinforces the principle of separation of powers, holding that courts are bound by constitutional provisions that delegate specific powers to other branches of government, even if the application of such provisions may result in perceived injustices. Consequently, any future efforts to expand or limit the State's liability for torts will require legislative action rather than a judicial reinterpretation of the Constitution.
