Shelley Weinstock v. Columbia University
78 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,157, 224 F.3d 33, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21278 (2000)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a Title VII discrimination case, once an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment by merely pointing to stray remarks or procedural irregularities. The plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that the employer's reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Facts:
- Shelley Weinstock was an Assistant Professor in the Chemistry Department at Barnard College, an affiliate of Columbia University, from 1985 to 1994.
- During her 1992-1993 tenure review, Weinstock received favorable recommendations from the Barnard Chemistry Department, the Barnard Committee on Appointments, Tenure and Promotions, and the Columbia Chemistry Department.
- Columbia's Provost, Jonathan Cole, convened a five-person ad hoc committee to review the nomination. The committee chair, Professor Alan Tall, telephoned committee members before their meeting and expressed his opinion that there were problems with Weinstock's candidacy.
- During the ad hoc committee meeting, Professors Tall and Silverstein referred to Weinstock by her first name and allegedly made comments that she seemed 'nice' and 'nurturing'.
- The ad hoc committee voted 3-2 to grant Weinstock tenure.
- After the vote, Provost Cole consulted with two other Columbia chemistry professors, Ronald Breslow and Richard Bersohn, who provided negative assessments of Weinstock's scholarship.
- Provost Cole learned from his inquiries that the Columbia Chemistry Department's favorable vote was merely a 'courtesy' to Barnard and that the department did not believe she was worthy of tenure.
- Provost Cole recommended against tenure, citing his conclusion that Weinstock's scholarship was not up to Columbia's standards, and Columbia's President accepted the recommendation, officially denying her tenure.
Procedural Posture:
- Shelley Weinstock filed a complaint against Columbia University in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- Weinstock alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX, and New York state and city human rights laws.
- Following discovery, Columbia University filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Weinstock had failed to produce evidence establishing a triable issue of fact as to pretext.
- Weinstock, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff in a Title VII sex discrimination case produce sufficient evidence of pretext to survive a motion for summary judgment by showing gender-based stereotyping and procedural irregularities in her tenure review process, when the university has proffered insufficient scholarship as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denial?
Opinions:
Majority - McLaughlin, J.
No. A plaintiff in a Title VII case does not survive summary judgment when she fails to produce sufficient evidence that the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse action was a pretext for discrimination. Columbia articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying tenure: Weinstock's scholarship was not up to the university's standards. Weinstock's evidence of pretext was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The alleged gender-stereotyping comments, such as calling her 'nice' and 'nurturing,' are innocuous and not stereotypically female, failing to rise to the level of discriminatory animus seen in cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Furthermore, the procedural irregularities, such as Professor Tall's phone calls and Provost Cole's delay in explaining his decision, did not affect the final outcome and do not suggest gender bias. Finally, Weinstock's claim of disparate treatment failed because she did not produce sufficient evidence that a less-qualified male candidate was treated more favorably. Courts should not act as 'Super-Tenure Review Committees' and second-guess a university's academic judgment when there is no evidence of discriminatory intent.
Dissenting - Cardamone, J.
Yes. The plaintiff raised numerous genuine issues of material fact regarding both pretext and whether the tenure decision resulted from sex discrimination. The record contains significant evidence that the university's proffered reason was pretextual, including procedural irregularities that violated the spirit of the university's agreement with Barnard, Provost Cole's active and negative role despite his lack of expertise, and his seeking of post-hoc negative opinions to justify his predetermined decision. The use of terms like 'nice' and 'nurturing' to describe a female scientist in a tenure review is evidence of gender stereotyping, punishing Weinstock for fitting a feminine stereotype perceived as incompatible with a successful researcher. The dissent identifies twelve distinct disputed factual issues, particularly concerning Provost Cole's credibility and conduct, which a reasonable jury could find to be evidence that the real reason for the tenure denial was sex discrimination.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in academic tenure discrimination cases at the summary judgment stage. It illustrates the judiciary's significant deference to the substantive academic judgments of universities, treating them as uniquely qualified to determine scholarly merit. The ruling indicates that stray remarks, minor procedural flaws, or a difference of opinion on scholarly merit are generally insufficient to prove pretext. For a plaintiff to succeed, they must present strong, direct evidence linking procedural irregularities or biased comments to the ultimate decision, showing they were not just incidental flaws but were instead causally related to a discriminatory motive.
