Sheldon v. Fettig
129 Wash.2d 601 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The term 'house of usual abode' for the purpose of substitute service of process should be liberally construed to effectuate service. A defendant may have more than one house of usual abode if each location serves as a center of their domestic activity where it is highly probable they will receive notice of a lawsuit.
Facts:
- Francine Fettig and Pamela Sheldon were involved in a car accident on July 15, 1989.
- Eight months before being served, Fettig moved to Chicago to work as a flight attendant and signed a 13-month lease on an apartment with roommates.
- Prior to moving to Chicago, Fettig lived in her parents' Seattle home for at least two months after giving up her previous apartment.
- Fettig maintained numerous official connections to her parents' Seattle address, including her voter registration, car registration, and the address given for a speeding ticket.
- As a new flight attendant with significant time off, Fettig frequently flew back to Seattle and stayed at her parents' home for several days each month.
- Sheldon's attorney had previously contacted Fettig by phone at the parents' home and successfully corresponded with her by mail at that address.
- A process server left a copy of the summons and complaint for Fettig with her brother at her parents' Seattle home.
- Fettig left many of her personal belongings at her parents' home when she moved to Chicago.
Procedural Posture:
- Pamela Sheldon sued Francine Fettig for damages in Grant County Superior Court (a trial court).
- Fettig filed a notice of special appearance and answered the complaint, asserting the affirmative defense of improper service of process.
- After the statute of limitations expired, Fettig moved for summary judgment, arguing the court lacked personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service.
- The trial court denied Fettig's motion, ruling that she maintained two 'personal abodes' and that service was proper.
- Fettig (as appellant) sought review from the Washington Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Fettig (as petitioner) then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court (the state's highest court), which granted review.
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Issue:
Does leaving a copy of a summons and complaint at a defendant's parents' home constitute service at the defendant's 'house of usual abode' under RCW 4.28.080(15) when the defendant lives and works in another state but maintains significant personal and legal connections to the parents' home and returns there frequently?
Opinions:
Majority - Sanders, J.
Yes. Leaving the summons at Fettig's parents' home constituted valid service at her 'house of usual abode.' The court held that service of process statutes should be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose, which is to provide notice in a fashion reasonably calculated to succeed. The court found that Fettig treated her parents' home as a 'center of her domestic activity' by using it for voter registration, car registration, and as a contact point. Given these connections and her frequent returns, leaving the summons there was reasonably calculated to provide her with actual notice. The court also recognized that in a mobile society, a person can maintain more than one 'house of usual abode,' and Fettig's parents' home qualified as one.
Dissenting - Talmadge, J.
No. Leaving the summons at Fettig's parents' home did not constitute valid service at her 'house of usual abode.' The dissent argued that statutes for substitute service, being a departure from common law, must be strictly construed. 'House of usual abode' means the place where the defendant is actually living at the time of service, which for Fettig was her leased apartment in Chicago. The statute's use of the singular 'house' implies a person has only one such abode. The majority's liberal construction injects uncertainty into the law, and the plaintiff had other valid, unambiguous methods of service available, such as the nonresident motorist statute, which she failed to use.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the definition of 'house of usual abode' in Washington by rejecting a strict construction in favor of a flexible, fact-based standard focused on the likelihood of notice. It establishes the precedent that highly mobile individuals can have multiple 'usual abodes' for service of process purposes. This ruling makes it easier for plaintiffs to serve defendants who travel frequently or split time between residences, but it also creates potential uncertainty for such defendants regarding where they can be legally served.
