Shea v. Matassa
918 A.2d 1090, 2007 Del. LEXIS 45, 2007 WL 283628 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
The creation of common law causes of action for dram shop liability (commercial vendors) or social host liability (private individuals) for injuries caused by intoxicated adults falls within the exclusive purview of the legislature, not the judiciary, especially when the legislature actively regulates the subject matter.
Facts:
- On July 17, 2004, Philip Healy attended a funeral reception at Harry’s Savoy Grill in Wilmington, Delaware.
- After the reception, Healy drove to the home of his sister, Kathryn Matassa, in Longneck, Delaware, to attend a family gathering at approximately 4:00 p.m., where he consumed alcohol.
- Healy left Matassa’s home at approximately 10:30 p.m. and later went to Arena’s Bar & Deli in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, where he consumed more alcohol.
- At approximately 1:15 a.m. on July 18, 2004, Healy left Arena’s and drove northbound on Delaware Route 1, crashing into another car, damaging his headlights, and injuring the passenger of that car.
- Healy continued driving and crossed the median, driving north in the southbound lanes of Route 1 for approximately nine miles.
- At approximately 2:05 a.m., Healy collided head-on with on-duty Delaware State Police Corporal Christopher M. Shea.
- Corporal Shea survived for 49 minutes, dying at 2:54 a.m., and Healy died at the scene.
- Healy’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident was .336.
Procedural Posture:
- Susan Shea, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Christopher M. Shea and as Parent and Next Friend of Christopher M. Shea, Jr. and Elizabeth L. Shea, filed a complaint in Superior Court on July 20, 2005, against Kathryn Matassa and the Tavern defendant-appellees (XL Group, Ltd., John Bisaha, and John Doe).
- The complaint alleged that the defendants negligently caused Corporal Shea’s death by serving alcoholic beverages to Philip Healy.
- Tavern defendant-appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on October 11, 2005.
- The Superior Court trial judge granted the Tavern defendant-appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 10, 2006.
- Shea appealed this ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court on February 1, 2006, which the Supreme Court dismissed as interlocutory.
- Kathryn Matassa moved for summary judgment on January 10, 2006.
- The Superior Court trial judge granted Matassa’s motion for summary judgment on March 31, 2006.
- On April 26, 2006, Shea filed a Notice of Appeal in the Delaware Supreme Court, seeking reversal of both the judgment on the pleadings for the Tavern defendant-appellees and the summary judgment for Matassa.
- On July 28, 2006, Tavern defendant-appellees moved to affirm the trial judge’s decision granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Matassa moved to affirm the trial judge’s decision granting summary judgment.
- The Delaware Supreme Court denied these motions to affirm on August 9, 2006.
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Issue:
Does the Delaware Supreme Court have the authority or should it, in the absence of specific legislation, establish common law causes of action for (1) dram shop liability against commercial alcohol vendors and (2) social host liability against individuals who serve alcohol to intoxicated adults, for injuries caused by the intoxicated person?
Opinions:
Majority - STEELE, Chief Justice
No, the Delaware Supreme Court will not establish common law causes of action for dram shop liability or social host liability. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgments, concluding that the creation of such causes of action involves significant public policy considerations and falls within the exclusive purview of the General Assembly. For dram shop liability, the Court reiterated its long-standing line of cases deferring to the legislature, noting the General Assembly's extensive regulation of alcohol sale and use, and its prior consideration and rejection of dram shop legislation. The Court emphasized that the legislature is better equipped to gather empirical data and resolve complex public policy questions regarding the scope and implications of such liability. The Court distinguished Beattie v. Beattie, which abrogated interspousal immunity, by noting that Beattie involved overturning a judicially-created doctrine in an area where the legislature had not acted, whereas here, the request was to create a new cause of action in an area heavily regulated by the legislature. For social host liability, the Court also deferred to the General Assembly. While statutory regulation specifically for social host liability was less direct, the broader field of alcohol regulation demonstrated legislative awareness and policy choices. The Court distinguished DiOssi v. Maroney, which found a social host liable, by pointing out that DiOssi was based on premises liability (business invitee) and explicitly cautioned against extending liability to other guests based on dispensing alcohol. The Court found it anomalous to impose greater legal responsibility on social hosts than on trained, licensed commercial vendors, and reiterated that the person consuming alcohol is generally considered the sole proximate cause of injury. The Court concluded that creating such a cause of action raises controversial public policy issues best resolved by the legislature.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the principle of judicial deference to the legislative branch on matters of significant public policy in Delaware, especially when the legislature has actively regulated the specific field. It establishes a firm precedent against the judicial creation of dram shop and social host liability within the state, underscoring the separation of powers doctrine. Future litigants in Delaware seeking to establish such liability will likely need to pursue legislative change rather than rely on common law claims, unless their case can be framed under a distinct, established legal theory like premises liability.
