Shaw v. Hunt
517 U.S. 899 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Racial classifications in redistricting schemes must withstand strict scrutiny, meaning they must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, and a district drawn without regard for geographic compactness cannot be narrowly tailored to remedy a potential Voting Rights Act Section 2 violation.
Facts:
- After the 1990 census, North Carolina's congressional delegation increased from 11 to 12 members.
- The North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment plan, Chapter 601, which included one majority-black district (District 1).
- The U.S. Attorney General objected to Chapter 601 under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, stating it failed to give effect to black and Native American voting strength and that reasons for not creating a second majority-minority district were pretextual.
- The legislature revised its plan, adopting Chapter 7, which included a second majority-black district (District 12) located in the north-central or Piedmont region.
- District 12 was approximately 160 miles long, no wider than the Interstate-85 corridor for much of its length, and wound in a snakelike fashion through various areas, 'gobbling in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods'.
- Five North Carolinians, including Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, commenced an action challenging the plan.
- The State's submission for preclearance of Chapter 7 expressly acknowledged that its 'overriding purpose' was to comply with the Attorney General's objection and create two congressional districts with effective black voting majorities.
Procedural Posture:
- After the U.S. Attorney General objected to North Carolina's initial reapportionment plan (Chapter 601) under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the state revised its plan to create Chapter 7, including a second majority-black district.
- Five North Carolinians commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against various state officials, alleging the plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander (this was the Shaw I complaint).
- The District Court dismissed the complaint.
- The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the District Court's dismissal in Shaw v. Reno (509 U. S. 630, 1993) (Shaw I), holding that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause and remanded the case for further consideration.
- On remand, the District Court allowed several individuals to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendants.
- After a 6-day trial, the District Court unanimously found that the plan's lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts of a certain racial composition.
- A majority of the District Court held that the plan was constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to further the State’s compelling interests in complying with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
- The dissenting judge disagreed with that portion of the judgment.
- The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction (indicating it would hear the appeal).
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Issue:
Does North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan, which created a second majority-black district (District 12) with an extremely irregular shape, violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes, North Carolina's redistricting plan, Chapter 7, which created District 12, violates the Equal Protection Clause because the reapportionment scheme is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court reiterated that racially gerrymandered districting schemes, like all racial classifications, are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict scrutiny if race was the 'dominant and controlling' consideration, subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles. Here, the District Court's findings, supported by the district's bizarre shape and the state's admission that its 'overriding purpose' was to create two majority-black districts, comport with the 'predominant factor' standard for strict scrutiny. The Court then evaluated North Carolina's asserted compelling interests: remedying past discrimination, complying with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court found no sufficient evidence that remedying past discrimination was the actual purpose, as the reports cited were not before the legislature. Regarding Section 5, the Court, consistent with Miller v. Johnson, rejected the Justice Department's 'maximization' policy as an improper interpretation of Section 5, thus removing compliance with that interpretation as a compelling interest. Assuming arguendo that avoiding Section 2 liability could be a compelling interest, the Court held that District 12 was not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. A Section 2 violation requires a showing that the minority group is 'geographically compact,' and District 12's highly irregular and non-compact shape could not remedy a potential Section 2 violation. The Court rejected the argument that a majority-minority district could be drawn anywhere in the state, emphasizing that vote-dilution injuries are individual and geographically specific. Therefore, creating a safe majority-black district elsewhere does not remedy a geographically specific vote-dilution injury.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, North Carolina's redistricting plan for District 12 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, and the Court's aggressive supervision of state action designed to accommodate minority groups is misguided. Justice Stevens first questioned the standing of the plaintiffs, arguing their grievance was more partisan than a claim of racial discrimination and that the alleged harm (message of racial separatism) affects all equally, not a specific individual on account of race. He argued that strict scrutiny should not apply unless race is the 'predominant' consideration, subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles, and the evidence here does not meet that demanding threshold. North Carolina's concession about its 'overriding purpose' was merely to comply with federal law, not to subordinate other principles. Furthermore, District 12's noncompactness does not necessarily indicate a deviation from state districting principles, as North Carolina law does not require compactness. He pointed to race-neutral explanations for District 12's shape, such as protecting Democratic incumbents and uniting communities of urban voters, which suggests political and community-of-interest considerations were determinative, not solely race. Justice Stevens also argued that North Carolina had at least three compelling interests: remedying the state's history of race relations, avoiding litigation over the Attorney General's Section 5 objection (after an independent assessment), and avoiding Section 2 litigation. He contended that the plan was narrowly tailored because it successfully avoided potential Section 2 liability, noting that a state has more discretion than a federal court in crafting remedies, and no white voters had their votes unlawfully diluted.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Justice Souter's views on this case are substantially expressed in his dissent to Bush v. Vera, a related case decided on the same day. (His dissent in Bush v. Vera generally argued that the Court's application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious districting, particularly when motivated by Voting Rights Act compliance, was overly rigid and that such districts did not constitute racial discrimination in the traditional sense.)
Analysis:
This case solidified the application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious districting when race is the 'predominant' factor, even if motivated by compliance with the Voting Rights Act. It significantly limited states' ability to create majority-minority districts by rejecting the Justice Department's 'maximization' policy under Section 5 and by imposing a stringent 'narrow tailoring' requirement for Section 2 compliance. The ruling emphasized that remedies for vote dilution must be geographically specific and cannot create non-compact districts to serve a statewide interest, thereby making it harder for states to proactively address potential Section 2 violations through districting that deviates from traditional principles.
