Sharp Ex Rel. Sharp v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
569 P.2d 178, 1977 Alas. LEXIS 404 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
An unforeseeable and extraordinary intervening act by a third party can break the chain of legal causation, relieving an originally negligent defendant of liability for harm even if their conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
Facts:
- During the 1973-74 school year, Wayne Sharp, Jr. was a fourth-grader at North Pole Elementary School and a participant in the school's wrestling program, supervised by Coach R. J. McKinstry.
- The Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) invited North Pole wrestlers who were AAU members to participate in its Northern Regional Wrestling Tournament at the University of Alaska's Patty Gymnasium.
- The school agreed to excuse participants from school on the first day of the tournament, Friday, April 12, 1974, with parental permission and provided one-way bus transportation to the gymnasium, but Coach McKinstry distributed a letter clarifying the AAU event was not school-sponsored and parents were responsible for transportation after matches.
- On the first day of the tournament, supervision of the North Pole wrestlers was minimal, as Coach McKinstry was officiating and no other adult had been formally designated by the school to supervise.
- During a recess, Wayne Sharp, Jr. and three other boys requested Frances Frey (Mrs. Frey), mother of student-participant Marty Frey, to take them to lunch, and Mrs. Frey agreed, stating she would stop at Market Basket to ask Wayne Sharp, Jr.'s father for permission.
- After leaving the gymnasium, Mrs. Frey stopped at her husband's place of business and asked Marty Frey to refuel her automobile, during which gasoline overflowed onto Wayne Sharp, Jr.'s and Marty Frey's pants.
- Mrs. Frey ordered the boys back into her car and told them to leave the gasoline alone, but while she was inside the shop, Marty Frey lit the gasoline spot on Wayne Sharp, Jr.'s pants, causing second and third-degree burns to his lower right leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Claude Wayne Sharp, Jr. and his father, Claude Wayne Sharp, Sr., filed a complaint (later amended) in superior court, alleging negligence against the Freys and the Fairbanks North Star Borough.
- Claims against the Freys were dismissed with prejudice after a settlement.
- The superior court granted the Fairbanks North Star Borough's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borough was under no duty to supervise or, alternatively, that any breach of duty was not the proximate cause of the injuries.
- Claude Wayne Sharp, Jr. and Claude Wayne Sharp, Sr. (appellants) appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Alaska.
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Issue:
Does an intervening act by a third party, which is highly extraordinary and not reasonably foreseeable, constitute a superseding cause that severs the chain of legal causation, thereby relieving an allegedly negligent school district of liability for a student's injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - Rabinowitz, Justice
Yes, an intervening act by a third party that is highly extraordinary and not reasonably foreseeable does constitute a superseding cause, severing the chain of legal causation and relieving an allegedly negligent school district of liability. The court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the school district sponsored the event, owed a non-delegable duty of supervision, and failed to supervise adequately. However, the court found that the Borough's assumed negligence was not the legal cause of Wayne Sharp, Jr.'s injuries on two alternative grounds. First, the Borough's assumed negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm because, given the specific conduct of the Freys (taking the boys off-site, refueling, allowing them to remain unsupervised, and Marty Frey's intentional ignition of the fuel), no reasonable person would regard the Borough's failure to supervise at the tournament as a legal cause and attach responsibility to it. To hold the Borough responsible in these circumstances would impose an 'unreasonably heavy burden' and effectively make the school district an insurer of its students. Second, Mrs. Frey's actions constituted a superseding cause because they were an intervening force that actively operated to produce the harm, and her actions were not reasonably foreseeable. The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 435, 440, 441(1), and 442, emphasizing that it was 'highly extraordinary' that the school's failure to supervise at the gymnasium would lead to this specific harm through the Freys' conduct. Analyzing the factors for superseding cause under Restatement § 442, the court concluded that Mrs. Frey’s actions qualified as a superseding cause, relieving the Borough of liability. Although proximate cause is typically a question for the trier of fact, it becomes a question of law when the undisputed evidence allows no reasonable minds to differ.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limits of legal causation in negligence claims, particularly concerning the concept of superseding cause. It establishes that even where a defendant's initial negligence might have been a 'but for' cause, an independent, unforeseeable, and extraordinary intervening act by a third party can sever the chain of causation, preventing the defendant from being held liable. The decision has substantial implications for entities with a duty of supervision, such as schools, by limiting their liability for harms that arise from truly unforeseen and independent actions occurring outside their immediate control, thus balancing the need for accountability with the practical realities of supervision and avoiding an 'insurer' status.
