Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
1987 U.S. LEXIS 2053, 481 U.S. 615, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits discrimination against identifiable groups based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, such as Jews, even if those groups are not considered a separate 'race' by modern standards, provided they were viewed as a distinct race at the time the statute was enacted.
Facts:
- On November 2, 1982, the outside walls of the synagogue of the Shaare Tefila Congregation in Silver Spring, Maryland, were sprayed with red and black paint.
- Large anti-Semitic slogans, phrases, and symbols were painted on the synagogue walls.
- The Shaare Tefila Congregation and some individual members believed the defendants were motivated by racial prejudice.
- The Congregation alleged that the defendants' actions deprived them of the right to hold property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
Procedural Posture:
- The Shaare Tefila Congregation and some individual members filed a suit in Federal District Court against the defendants.
- The suit alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3) and Maryland common law claims (trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
- Defendants moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).
- The District Court dismissed all the claims.
- The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal in all respects (785 F. 2d 523 (CA4 1986)).
- Petitioners (Shaare Tefila Congregation) petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
- The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari (479 U.S. 812 (1986)).
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Issue:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibit discrimination against identifiable groups, such as Jews, based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, even if those groups are not considered a separate race by modern standards, when they were considered a distinct race at the time the statute was enacted?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 does prohibit discrimination against identifiable groups like Jews based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, even if they are not considered a separate race by modern standards, as long as they were viewed as a distinct race at the time the statute was enacted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding, which incorrectly concluded that Jews could not state a § 1982 claim because they are not considered a separate race today. Drawing from Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court reiterated that the definition of race when § 1982 was passed (1866) was broader than modern understandings and was intended to protect 'identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.' Legislative history demonstrated that Jews and Arabs were among the groups considered distinct races at the time of the statute's adoption, thus falling within its protection. Therefore, Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action under § 1982 against other members of what today is considered the Caucasian race.
Analysis:
This case, decided in conjunction with Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, significantly broadened the understanding of 'race' under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. It clarified that the statute's protections are determined by the societal and congressional understanding of 'race' at the time of its enactment in 1866, rather than by modern biological or social definitions. This ensures that historical forms of discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity, like anti-Semitism, can be addressed under the statute, preventing its scope from being narrowed by evolving social classifications. The ruling reinforced the statute's role as a potent tool against ethnic and ancestral discrimination, even if the victim group is phenotypically similar to the discriminator.
