Seymour v. Adams
638 So.2d 1044, 1994 WL 277906 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A landlord's statutory lien for unpaid rent does not, by itself, confer a right to possess the tenant's personal property. To lawfully take possession and enforce the lien, the landlord must follow the statutory distress for rent procedure and obtain a court-issued distress writ.
Facts:
- Michael J. Seymour leased a house from John and Ann Adams for use as a business office.
- Seymour defaulted on rent payments, leading to a court-ordered eviction.
- On March 26, 1991, the Adamses retook possession of the premises after the sheriff executed a writ of possession, changing the locks while Seymour's personal property remained inside.
- Seymour immediately requested the return of his personal property, but the Adamses refused, claiming they were holding it as security for the unpaid rent.
- On June 11, 1991, Seymour made a formal written demand for his property, which the Adamses again refused.
- Sometime after the eviction, the Adamses moved most of Seymour's property into a storage shed they owned.
- In February 1992, the judgment for unpaid rent was satisfied in full.
- After the debt was paid, Seymour again requested his property, but the Adamses refused, this time demanding payment for storage fees.
Procedural Posture:
- The Adamses filed an eviction action against Seymour in the trial court for non-payment of rent.
- The trial court entered a summary final judgment of eviction against Seymour on March 22, 1991, awarding the Adamses $8,600 in unpaid rent and terminating the lease.
- Seymour and Seymour Construction later filed the instant action against the Adamses in the trial court, alleging conversion, civil theft, replevin, and other claims.
- The Adamses moved for summary judgment on all counts, and Seymour filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his conversion and civil theft claims.
- The trial court denied Seymour's motion and granted summary final judgment in favor of the Adamses on all counts of the complaint.
- Seymour, as appellant, appealed the summary final judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, with the Adamses as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a landlord's statutory lien for unpaid rent grant the landlord the right to retain possession of an evicted tenant's personal property as security for the debt, without first obtaining a distress writ through the required statutory procedure?
Opinions:
Majority - Griffin, J.
No. A landlord's statutory lien for unpaid rent does not confer a right to possess the tenant's property. The common law remedy of self-help has been superseded by Florida's statutory distress for rent procedure, which a landlord must follow to enforce such a lien. The Adamses' retention of Seymour's personalty was an act of conversion because they failed to obtain a distress writ as required by Chapter 83 of the Florida Statutes. A lien is merely a claim against property, not an automatic right to possession. Similarly, the docketing of a writ of execution only establishes lien priority and does not grant possessory rights until a sheriff levies on the property. Furthermore, the Adamses could not claim storage fees under the Disposition of Personal Property Act (Chapter 715) because they failed to comply with its notice requirements and wrongfully withheld the property from the outset.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that Florida law does not permit landlords to engage in 'self-help' by seizing a tenant's personal property to satisfy a rent debt. It firmly establishes that the statutory remedy of distress for rent is the exclusive means to enforce a landlord's lien, replacing the common law right to seize property. The decision serves as a significant protection for tenants, warning landlords that failure to adhere to strict statutory procedures can expose them to tort liability for conversion and even civil theft, which carries the potential for treble damages. This holding reinforces the critical legal distinction between having a security interest in property (a lien) and having the legal right to possess it.
