Sessions v. Dimaya
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A federal statute defining a "crime of violence" using a residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause if it requires courts to first imagine the "ordinary case" of a crime and then apply an imprecise risk standard to that abstraction. This combination of indeterminacies fails to provide fair notice and invites arbitrary enforcement.
Facts:
- James Dimaya, a native of the Philippines, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1992.
- Dimaya was convicted on two separate occasions of first-degree burglary under California law.
- California's first-degree burglary statute criminalizes entering an inhabited dwelling with the intent to commit a felony.
- Following his second conviction, the U.S. government sought to deport Dimaya on the grounds that his burglary convictions qualified as "aggravated felonies."
Procedural Posture:
- Following Dimaya's second burglary conviction, the Government initiated removal proceedings against him in immigration court.
- An Immigration Judge found that California first-degree burglary is a 'crime of violence' under § 16(b), rendering Dimaya deportable.
- Dimaya appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision.
- Dimaya then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the BIA's final order of removal.
- While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held a similar residual clause in another statute was unconstitutionally vague.
- The Ninth Circuit, as the intermediate appellate court, held that § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague under Johnson's reasoning and granted Dimaya's petition for review.
- The Attorney General, as the petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which defines a "crime of violence" as a felony that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force...may be used," violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause on the grounds of being unconstitutionally vague?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kagan
Yes. The residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague. The Court's prior decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated a nearly identical residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), controls this case. Like ACCA's clause, § 16(b) has two features that conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague: (1) it requires courts to speculate about the 'ordinary case' of a crime without any guidance, and (2) it layers an imprecise standard ('substantial risk') on top of that speculative inquiry. This combination of indeterminacies creates 'more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.' The government's attempts to textually distinguish § 16(b) from ACCA's clause are unpersuasive, as minor differences in wording do not cure the fundamental vagueness. Furthermore, precedent requires applying the most exacting vagueness standard in removal cases due to the 'grave nature of deportation'.
Concurring - Justice Gorsuch
Yes. The statute is unconstitutionally vague. This conclusion follows directly from the precedent set in Johnson, but the void-for-vagueness doctrine itself is deeply rooted in originalist principles of due process and separation of powers. Vague laws are unconstitutional because they fail to provide fair notice to citizens about what conduct is prohibited and because they impermissibly delegate legislative power to judges and prosecutors, allowing for arbitrary enforcement. This doctrine is not limited to criminal statutes; fair notice is a fundamental requirement before the government can impose severe civil penalties, such as deportation. The 'ordinary case' analysis required by § 16(b) is unworkable, leaving judges to rely on 'intuitions and the people to their fate,' which is an exercise of will, not judgment.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague. The majority wrongly equates § 16(b) with the ACCA clause struck down in Johnson, ignoring significant textual differences that make § 16(b) far clearer. Specifically, § 16(b) (1) uses the term 'risk' instead of the more speculative 'potential risk,' (2) focuses on the offender's 'use' of 'physical force,' a more constrained inquiry than risk of 'physical injury,' (3) contains a temporal limit—'in the course of committing the offense'— and (4) is not benchmarked against a confusing list of exemplar crimes. These distinctions remove the 'hopeless indeterminacy' that plagued the ACCA clause, and this Court had no trouble applying § 16(b) in the past, as demonstrated in Leocal v. Ashcroft.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague. The modern void-for-vagueness doctrine itself has dubious origins and is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. Even accepting the doctrine, respondent's prior conviction for residential burglary falls squarely within the core of what § 16(b) covers, so he cannot succeed on a vagueness challenge. The true problem is not the statute, but the Court's insistence on using the judicially-created 'categorical approach.' If that approach renders the statute vague, the proper remedy is to abandon the interpretation, not invalidate the statute. A 'conduct-based' approach, which examines the defendant's actual conduct, would be a reasonable and constitutional reading of the statute.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and extends the Court's holding in Johnson v. United States, solidifying the principle that statutes defining crimes via a residual clause are constitutionally suspect if they combine an 'ordinary case' inquiry with an indeterminate risk threshold. The ruling significantly impacts immigration law by invalidating a key provision used to classify aliens as 'aggravated felons,' making it harder for the government to deport lawful permanent residents based on certain prior convictions. The decision also creates uncertainty for other federal statutes that incorporate § 16(b)'s definition of 'crime of violence,' potentially affecting numerous criminal and sentencing provisions beyond the immigration context. Justice Gorsuch's influential concurrence, grounding the vagueness doctrine in separation of powers, signals a potential shift in how the Court analyzes such challenges in the future.
Unlock the full brief for Sessions v. Dimaya