Sessa v. Riegle
427 F. Supp. 760 (1977)
Rule of Law:
A seller's statement of opinion or commendation, such as that a horse is "sound," does not create an express warranty when the buyer is knowledgeable and relies on their own expert agent's inspection. Furthermore, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not arise if the buyer does not rely on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the goods.
Facts:
- Joseph Sessa, Jr. (Sessa), an experienced owner and racer of standardbred horses, became interested in purchasing a horse named Tarport Conaway from Gene Riegle (Riegle), a professional horse dealer.
- Sessa sent Robert J. Maloney, a knowledgeable horseman, to Riegle's farm in Ohio as his agent to inspect and purchase the horse.
- On March 10, 1973, Maloney performed an unrestricted examination of Tarport Conaway, including jogging the horse.
- After the inspection, Maloney called Sessa, stated he 'liked' the horse, and then handed the phone to Riegle.
- In a brief conversation, Riegle told Sessa that Tarport Conaway was a good, sound horse that Sessa would like.
- Following the call, Maloney completed the transaction by giving Riegle a check for the $25,000 purchase price.
- On March 23, 1973, Riegle delivered the horse to a carrier for shipment to Sessa.
- Upon arrival on March 24, 1973, a veterinarian diagnosed the horse with tendinitis, and five days later, the horse went lame due to intermittent claudication, a condition caused by a thrombosis (blood blockage) in its arteries.
- Sessa demanded that Riegle take the horse back and refund his money, but Riegle refused.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff, Joseph Sessa, Jr., filed a civil action against defendants, Gene Riegle, Mrs. Gene Riegle, and Mrs. John A. Frantz, in the United States District Court.
- The complaint alleged breach of express warranties, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
- A trial was held before the court without a jury.
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Issue:
Did the seller of a standardbred racehorse breach express warranties, the implied warranty of merchantability, or the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the horse developed physical ailments after the sale, where the buyer was knowledgeable and used his own agent to inspect the horse prior to purchase?
Opinions:
Majority - Hannum, District Judge
No, the seller did not breach any warranties. Riegle's statement that the horse was 'sound' constituted mere opinion or commendation ('puffing') under UCC § 2-313(2), not an express warranty, because it was made between knowledgeable parties and Sessa did not rely on the statement. The credible evidence showed that Sessa relied principally on the judgment of his own expert agent, Maloney, who conducted an inspection. Therefore, Riegle's statement was not part of the 'basis of the bargain.' Furthermore, even if a warranty existed, Sessa, as the buyer who accepted the goods, failed to meet his burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the horse's ailments existed at the time the risk of loss passed to him (i.e., when the horse was delivered to the carrier). Regarding the implied warranty of merchantability under UCC § 2-314, the horse was merchantable because it was fit for the ordinary purpose of a racehorse; despite its ailments, it eventually raced and won, and the standard is not perfection but reasonable fitness. Finally, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under UCC § 2-315 did not arise because Sessa did not rely on Riegle's skill or judgment to select the horse, a required element for this warranty.
Analysis:
This case provides a key illustration of the distinction between an express warranty and mere 'puffing' under the Uniform Commercial Code. It establishes that the context of a sale, including the buyer's expertise and whether the buyer relied on their own inspection agent, is critical in determining if a seller's statement is an affirmation of fact or simply an opinion. The decision reinforces that the burden of proof is on the buyer to demonstrate that a defect existed at the time of sale or transfer of risk. This precedent is significant in transactions involving specialized goods like livestock, where both parties may be experts and the goods are susceptible to latent health issues, clarifying that disappointment in a product's performance does not automatically equate to a breach of warranty.
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