Sergey Sologub v. The City of New York
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 772, 202 F.3d 175, 2000 A.M.C. 742 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
To qualify as a 'seaman' under the Jones Act, a worker's connection to a vessel in navigation must be substantial in both duration and nature, meaning they must be a sea-based maritime worker, not a predominantly land-based employee whose duties are shoreside.
Facts:
- Sergey Sologub, an experienced maritime worker, was hired by the City of New York's Division of Ferries in the civil service title of deckhand in June 1995.
- The Division of Ferries employed approximately 196 deckhands, with about 70% assigned to work on the ferryboats and 30% assigned to shoreside support at the terminals.
- From June 30, 1995, to September 22, 1995, Sologub worked intermittently on various ferryboats and at the terminals.
- Beginning on September 26, 1995, and continuing until his accident, Sologub was regularly assigned to land-based terminal duties as a bridgeman or apronman, operating pedestrian walkways and vehicle ramps from a dockside station.
- During this nearly seven-month period of terminal assignment, Sologub served only one eight-hour tour of duty aboard a ferry.
- On the night of April 15, 1996, while performing his terminal duties, Sologub was standing on pilings to receive mooring lines from a ferry when the boat struck the slip, causing him to fall and sustain serious injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Sergey Sologub filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against his employer, The City of New York.
- Sologub sought to recover damages for personal injuries under the Jones Act, claiming he was a 'seaman.'
- The City of New York moved for summary judgment, arguing Sologub was not a seaman for Jones Act purposes.
- The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding that Sologub was a land-based worker and not a seaman at the time of his injury.
- Sologub, as Plaintiff-Appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Is a maritime worker, hired as a deckhand but assigned to work almost exclusively in a land-based terminal position for approximately seven months prior to his injury, a 'seaman' entitled to recover under the Jones Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Miner, J.
No. A maritime worker whose assignment is almost exclusively land-based does not qualify as a 'seaman' under the Jones Act. To establish seaman status, a worker must satisfy a two-part test: (1) the worker's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the worker must have a connection to a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels that is substantial in both its duration and its nature. While Sologub's duties contributed to the ferry's mission, he failed the second part of the test. His connection to the vessels was not substantial in duration or nature because his assignment for a considerable period prior to the accident was 'totally land-based.' The court emphasized that the Jones Act is intended to protect sea-based maritime workers, not land-based employees. Sologub's job title as 'deckhand,' his prior intermittent work on the boats, and his aspirations for advancement were insufficient to overcome the fact that his actual, steady position at the time of injury was land-based.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the two-part test for seaman status established in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, emphasizing that a court's inquiry is fact-specific and focuses on the employee's actual duties over a relevant period of time, not on their job title or future career aspirations. The case clarifies that even employees who directly interact with vessels as part of their job (e.g., handling mooring lines) will be considered land-based workers if their primary work station is on shore. It solidifies the distinction between sea-based workers, who owe their allegiance to a vessel and are covered by the Jones Act, and land-based maritime workers, whose remedies lie elsewhere (like the LHWCA).
