Select Comfort Corporation v. John Baxter
Not provided in text (2021)
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Rule of Law:
A theory of initial-interest confusion may apply for trademark infringement in the Eighth Circuit where consumer sophistication is a question of fact, and literal falsity alone does not create a presumption of materiality in false advertising claims.
Facts:
- Select Comfort Corporation and Select Comfort SC Corporation own and market well-known adjustable air mattress brands, including 'SLEEP NUMBER,' 'WHAT’S YOUR SLEEP NUMBER,' 'SELECT COMFORT,' and 'COMFORTAIRE,' through company-owned stores, online, and over the phone.
- Dires, LLC, along with its principals John Baxter, Scott Stenzel, and Craig Miller, operates an online retail business ('personalcomfortbed.com') selling lower-priced adjustable air beds, utilizing internet advertising and a call-center-based sales model.
- Defendant Craig Miller worked as a consultant for Select Comfort from 2006 to 2011, and defendants Baxter and Stenzel previously worked for Comfortaire (later acquired by Select Comfort SC Corporation), where they developed advertising and sales techniques.
- Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants used words and phrases identical or confusingly similar to Plaintiffs' trademarks in various online advertising formats, including website URLs (e.g., personalcomfortbed.com/vSleepNumber), paid search terms, embedded links, and general text/graphic advertisements.
- Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants' call center employees either failed to dispel consumer confusion or actively made statements causing further source confusion, and that Defendants made false representations about their own and Plaintiffs' products.
- Evidence presented included Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' actual trademarks as paid search terms and in web advertising (e.g., 'Sleep 55% Off Number Beds'), survey evidence of actual consumer confusion, and transcripts of call-center interactions showing customers believing they were calling Plaintiffs.
- Defendants' principals were documented describing confusion between the brands as a 'good thing' and indicating their advertisements were 'working' in response to reports of confusion.
Procedural Posture:
- Select Comfort Corporation and Select Comfort SC Corporation (Plaintiffs) sued Dires, LLC, John Baxter, Digi Craft Agency, LLC, Direct Commerce, LLC, Scott Stenzel, and Craig Miller (Defendants) in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
- Plaintiffs asserted federal trademark infringement, trademark dilution, federal unfair competition and false advertising claims, and a state law deceptive trade practices claim.
- Defendants filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim, arguing Plaintiffs had no trademark rights in 'NUMBER BED' (generic or merely descriptive without secondary meaning) and that the registered mark 'SLEEP NUMBER' had become generic.
- Both parties moved for summary judgment on various claims.
- The district court denied summary judgment on whether 'SLEEP NUMBER' had become generic and whether 'NUMBER BED' had acquired secondary meaning.
- The district court granted summary judgment, ruling as a matter of law that initial-interest confusion could not apply because retail purchasers of mattresses were sophisticated consumers, therefore requiring Plaintiffs to show a likelihood of confusion at the time of purchase for trademark infringement claims.
- The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment regarding a false advertising claim based on an admitted literal falsity, finding the statements equivocal and presenting a factual question.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial on the trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, and false advertising claims.
- Consistent with its summary judgment ruling, the district court instructed the jury that a likelihood of confusion must exist at the time of purchase to support a trademark infringement claim.
- Over Defendants’ objection, the district court instructed the jury on false advertising using an instruction that allowed a presumption of materiality if a statement was literally false.
- The jury rejected the trademark infringement claims, found Plaintiffs held no trademark rights in 'NUMBER BED,' and found 'SLEEP NUMBER' famous but not diluted.
- The jury found for Plaintiffs on seven false advertising claims, awarding approximately $160,000, and for Defendants on the remaining eight.
- The district court denied several post-trial motions.
- Both Plaintiffs and Defendants filed appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Select Comfort Corporation as Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 19-1077, Defendants as Defendants-Appellees; Select Comfort Corporation as Plaintiffs-Appellees, Dires, LLC, Scott Stenzel, Craig Miller as Defendants-Appellants in No. 19-1113; John Baxter as Defendant-Appellant in No. 19-1178).
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Issue:
1. Does the theory of initial-interest confusion apply in the Eighth Circuit, and was it an error for the district court to rule as a matter of law that it could not apply in a case involving mattress sales to retail consumers? 2. Was it an error for the district court to instruct the jury that a finding of literal falsity in a false advertising claim creates a presumption of materiality?
Opinions:
Majority - Melloy, Circuit Judge
Yes, a theory of initial-interest confusion may apply in the Eighth Circuit when consumer sophistication is a question of fact, and it was error for the district court to preclude it as a matter of law. The court holds that most circuits recognize initial-interest confusion as a valid theory of trademark infringement because it protects against a competitor gaining a 'free ride on the goodwill' of an established mark, even if an actual sale is not completed due to the initial confusion. The 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act, by removing the word 'purchasers,' expanded trademark protection beyond point-of-sale confusion, as previously recognized for post-sale confusion in InstyBit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus. While Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co. (2010) declined to apply initial-interest confusion to sophisticated commercial purchasers who engaged in a collaborative purchasing process, the court clarifies that Sensient does not establish a general bar, and the question of consumer sophistication is typically a jury question. Given the mixed authority regarding the sophistication of mattress shoppers (expensive but infrequent purchase) and online shoppers (ease of surfing vs. expectation of 'back button'), combined with strong evidence of actual consumer confusion in this case, a jury question existed. Therefore, the district court's summary judgment ruling and subsequent jury instruction limiting infringement liability to confusion at the time of purchase were erroneous and not harmless. Yes, it was error for the district court to instruct the jury that a finding of literal falsity in a false advertising claim creates a presumption of materiality. The court explains that a literally false statement does not, by itself, necessarily make it more or less likely to influence a purchasing decision. While Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp. (8th Cir. 1997) approved presumptions for deception and damages* based on deliberate misrepresentations as part of important marketing efforts, it did not extend this to materiality. The court aligns with other circuits (First and Eleventh Circuits) which hold that materiality, focusing on whether a statement is likely to influence buying decisions, must be demonstrated and is not automatically presumed from literal falsity alone. The Fifth Circuit's approach was criticized for conflating deception and materiality. Consequently, the burden-shifting instruction on materiality based solely on literal falsity was erroneous and not harmless for the claims where Plaintiffs prevailed, warranting a new trial on those claims. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion to amend their counterclaim (regarding 'SLEEP NUMBER' being generic ab initio) as it was made after discovery closure and on the eve of trial, and clarified that in a trademark declaratory judgment action, the alleged rights owner bears the burden of proving protected rights.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the landscape of trademark infringement in the Eighth Circuit by adopting the initial-interest confusion theory, expanding the scope of protection beyond point-of-sale confusion. It strongly emphasizes that the determination of consumer sophistication is generally a fact question for the jury, preventing judges from dismissing such claims as a matter of law based on assumptions about purchasers. Furthermore, the ruling refines the elements of false advertising claims, making it clear that literal falsity alone does not automatically establish materiality, thus imposing a higher evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to prove that a false statement influenced purchasing decisions unless it inherently relates to product quality or comparative advertising. The clarification on the burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions for trademark rights is also important for future litigation strategy.
