Sekhar v. United States
186 L. Ed. 2d 794, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4920, 570 U.S. 729 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
To constitute "the obtaining of property from another" under the Hobbs Act, a defendant must seek to acquire transferable property from the victim, not merely to coerce the victim into performing an act.
Facts:
- Giridhar Sekhar was a managing partner of FA Technology Ventures, a firm seeking an investment from New York's Common Retirement Fund.
- The Fund's general counsel learned that another fund managed by Sekhar's firm was under investigation and made a written recommendation to the State Comptroller not to invest.
- Following this recommendation, the Comptroller decided not to issue a 'Commitment' to invest in the fund.
- The general counsel then received a series of anonymous e-mails, later traced to Sekhar, demanding that he recommend the investment.
- The e-mails threatened to disclose information about the general counsel's alleged extramarital affair to his wife and government officials if he did not comply.
Procedural Posture:
- Giridhar Sekhar was indicted in federal district court (a court of first instance) for attempted extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Sekhar.
- The jury's verdict form specified that the 'property' Sekhar attempted to extort was 'the General Counsel's recommendation to approve the Commitment.'
- Sekhar (as appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court) affirmed the conviction, holding that the general counsel had a 'property right' in rendering sound legal advice free from threats.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Sekhar's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does attempting to compel a person to make an official recommendation for an investment constitute the 'obtaining of property from another' under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. Attempting to compel an employee to make a particular recommendation does not constitute the 'obtaining of property from another' under the Hobbs Act because the alleged property is not transferable. The statute requires not only the deprivation of property from the victim but also the acquisition of that property by the perpetrator. The historical meaning of extortion, the text of the statute, and this Court's precedent in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. all confirm that the property must be capable of being passed from one person to another. An employee's recommendation or the 'right' to make it is not a transferable asset that can be 'obtained.' Forcing someone to act is coercion, a crime Congress chose not to include in the Hobbs Act when it modeled the statute on New York law, which distinguished between extortion and coercion.
Concurring - Justice Alito
No. A government employee's internal, non-binding recommendation regarding a government decision does not constitute 'property' within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. It is not customary to refer to an internal recommendation as a form of property, and it would be strange to say a government employee has a property interest in their internal suggestions. This conclusion is supported by Cleveland v. United States, which held that a state-issued license is not property in the hands of the state; a mere recommendation has an even weaker claim to being property. Because the recommendation itself is not property, the 'right to make the recommendation' cannot be a property right, and it is unnecessary to reach the majority's analysis of whether such a right could be 'obtained'.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the federal Hobbs Act by reinforcing the distinction between extortion and coercion. By holding that the 'property' obtained must be transferable, the Court limits the statute's application to the acquisition of assets, not merely compelling a person's actions or interfering with their rights. This clarification makes it more difficult for prosecutors to use the Hobbs Act in cases where threats are used to force a victim to do something, rather than to give something up. The split between the majority's focus on 'obtaining' and the concurrence's focus on 'property' provides two distinct but related analytical paths for future courts to limit the statute's reach in cases involving intangible rights.
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