Sedar v. Knowlton Construction Co.
551 N.E.2d 938, 49 Ohio St. 3d 193 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Ohio Revised Code 2305.131, a ten-year statute of repose for tort actions against architects and construction contractors, is constitutional and operates to prevent the accrual of a cause of action, thereby barring claims for injuries arising more than ten years after the completion of services, without violating the due process, right-to-a-remedy, or equal protection clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
Facts:
- Knowlton Construction Co. and The Richard E. Jacobs Group performed services related to the design and construction of an improvement to real property.
- The services performed by the architect and builder were completed no later than December 31, 1966.
- Sedar suffered personal injuries on September 11, 1985, which were allegedly caused by a defective and unsafe condition, specifically faulty door glass, in the constructed improvement.
- Sedar's injuries occurred over eighteen and one-half years after the completion of the construction-related services.
Procedural Posture:
- Sedar initiated a tort action in a trial court against Knowlton Construction Co. and The Richard E. Jacobs Group for personal injuries.
- The trial court likely dismissed Sedar's claim or granted summary judgment to the defendants, applying R.C. 2305.131 as a bar to the action.
- Sedar appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) as the appellant.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, upholding the application of R.C. 2305.131 against Sedar.
- Sedar, as the appellant, then appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 2305.131.
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Issue:
Does Ohio Revised Code 2305.131, a statute of repose that bars tort actions against architects and construction contractors more than ten years after the completion of their services, unconstitutionally deny due process, the right to a remedy, or equal protection under the Ohio and United States Constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Holmes, J.
Yes, Ohio Revised Code 2305.131 may constitutionally prevent the accrual of actions sounding in tort against architects, construction contractors, and others for injuries arising more than ten years after the completion of their services. The court distinguished a statute of repose, which potentially bars a suit before the cause of action accrues, from a statute of limitations, which limits the time to sue after accrual. R.C. 2305.131 was enacted to limit the expanded common-law liability of architects and builders to third parties, which arose from the demise of the privity of contract doctrine. The purpose is to mitigate the threat of defending stale claims due to faded memories, lost evidence, and unavailable witnesses. Regarding due process, the statute bears a real and substantial relation to the general welfare by limiting liability and is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary; a ten-year period is supported by statistical evidence of claims. The court emphasized it does not judge the wisdom of legislative enactments. Concerning the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, the court held that R.C. 2305.131 does not take away an existing cause of action but rather prevents a cause of action from ever arising. This provision applies only to existing, vested rights, and the legislature has the power to change common law rules. The medical malpractice discovery rule cases were distinguished because they dealt with delayed discovery of an existing injury, whereas construction cases involve the delayed occurrence of damage, and a third-party occupant has no actionable claim until physically injured. As to equal protection, the court applied a rational basis test. It found rational grounds for distinguishing architects and builders from owners/tenants (who have continuing control and maintenance responsibilities) and materialmen (who deal in standardized goods with factory-controlled quality). These distinctions are justified by the unique nature of their work, the lack of control over property after turnover, and the policy goal of encouraging design creativity. Therefore, the statute does not violate equal protection guarantees. Moyer, C.J., Wright, and H. Brown, JJ., concurred. Resnick, J., concurred in the syllabus and judgment only.
Dissenting - Douglas, J.
No, Ohio Revised Code 2305.131 unconstitutionally denies a remedy for injury. Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution clearly states that 'All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.' Sedar suffered severe personal injuries, but the statute of repose barred his ability to seek a remedy even before his injuries occurred. The majority's distinction between taking away an 'existing actionable claim' and preventing a 'cause of action from ever arising' is circuitous and artificial. Regardless of the mechanism, the result is the same: the courthouse doors are effectively closed to individuals like Sedar who suffer an injury. This contravenes the express language and intent of the constitutionally protected right to a remedy. Sweeney, J., concurred in the dissenting opinion.
Analysis:
This case establishes a strong precedent in Ohio for the constitutionality of statutes of repose for construction professionals, emphasizing the legislative power to define and limit common law rights. The court's distinction between preventing a cause of action from ever arising (repose) and extinguishing an existing one (limitations/discovery rule) is critical for understanding the scope of the right-to-a-remedy clause. The decision reflects a judicial deference to legislative policy choices aimed at balancing the interests of injured parties against the need to protect professionals from indefinite liability and the practical difficulties of litigating stale claims, particularly in the construction context. Future cases in Ohio will likely rely on this ruling when challenging similar statutes on due process, right-to-a-remedy, or equal protection grounds, especially where economic interests are at stake rather than suspect classifications or fundamental rights.
