Seattle Electric Co. v. Hovden
190 F. 7, 111 C.C.A. 191, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4426 (1911)
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Rule of Law:
The standard of care for contributory negligence considers a plaintiff's inherent physical or mental capacities, and a pedestrian crossing a streetcar track is not held to the same strict 'stop, look, and listen' rule as at a railroad crossing, having a right to assume streetcars will operate lawfully.
Facts:
- An injured pedestrian, while attempting to cross a street near the middle of a block, passed around the rear end of a stopped streetcar.
- The injured pedestrian saw a streetcar approaching in the opposite direction from approximately 475-500 feet away before she began to cross the street.
- The approaching streetcar struck and injured the pedestrian.
- The streetcar was running at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour, which was greatly in excess of the lawful speed limit of 12 miles per hour.
- The streetcar did not give any warning signals, such as ringing a bell, or otherwise.
- The injured pedestrian, despite being an adult familiar with streetcars, lacked the average adult's intelligence and capacity to care for herself.
Procedural Posture:
- The injured pedestrian (defendant in error) filed a complaint alleging negligence against the streetcar company (plaintiff in error) for operating at a dangerous speed and without warning.
- At the close of testimony, the streetcar company moved for an instructed verdict in its favor, arguing the pedestrian's contributory negligence was conclusively proven; the trial court denied this motion.
- A jury returned a verdict for damages in favor of the injured pedestrian.
- The streetcar company moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court overruled.
- Judgment was entered upon the jury's verdict.
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Issue:
Does a pedestrian's act of crossing a street mid-block, after seeing an approaching streetcar but without observing its speed, constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, especially when the pedestrian has diminished mental capacity and the streetcar was operating at an unlawfully high speed without warning?
Opinions:
Majority - Gilbert, Circuit Judge
No, a pedestrian's actions under these circumstances do not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, particularly when considering the pedestrian's diminished mental capacity and the streetcar's unlawful conduct. The court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the streetcar company negligent due to excessive speed and failure to give warnings. Regarding contributory negligence, the court held that in determining its existence, a plaintiff is not held liable for faults arising from inherent physical or mental defects or a lack of capacity to appreciate negligence, but only for failing to exercise the faculties and capacities with which they are endowed. This principle, derived from Baltimore & Potomac R. v. Cumberland, supported the lower court's refusal to grant a nonsuit or peremptory instruction. Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if the pedestrian had possessed ordinary capacity, crossing the street when the car was approximately 500 feet away might not be imprudent enough to be negligence as a matter of law, especially since she had the right to assume the car was not proceeding at an unlawful speed. The court emphasized that pedestrians crossing street railway tracks are not bound by the same strict 'stop, look, and listen' rules demanded of those crossing steam railroad tracks, as they are not trespassers and face a different standard of duty.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the standard of care in contributory negligence claims, particularly for individuals with diminished mental capacity, emphasizing a subjective standard based on individual faculties. It also distinctly differentiates the duty of care required of pedestrians when crossing streetcar tracks versus railroad tracks, providing more latitude for pedestrians in urban environments. The ruling reinforces the principle that plaintiffs can assume defendants will act lawfully, shifting some burden from pedestrians to uphold streetcar speed limits and safety protocols, thereby impacting future negligence cases involving public transit.
