Sears v. Morrison
90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A person who negligently places themselves in peril is liable for injuries sustained by a person who comes to their rescue. The rescue doctrine applies in first-party situations, where the rescuer is injured while attempting to save the negligent actor from their own self-created danger.
Facts:
- John D. Morrison placed a swamp cooler on a furniture dolly and removed its sides, exposing the running machinery while he worked on it.
- While trying to empty an ashtray, Morrison tripped on an electrical cord.
- The trip caused the operating swamp cooler to fall on top of Morrison.
- Elda R. Sears, who was present and feared for Morrison's health, attempted to lift the heavy machine off of him.
- In her attempt to lift the cooler, Sears's hand was severely cut by an exposed moving part of the machine.
Procedural Posture:
- Elda R. Sears sued John D. Morrison and his mother (the property owner) in a California trial court for negligence.
- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the rescue doctrine was inapplicable.
- The trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment, ruling that the rescue doctrine does not apply in a first-party rescue case.
- Sears, as the appellant, appealed the adverse judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does the rescue doctrine impose liability on a negligent actor for injuries sustained by a rescuer when the actor's negligence placed only himself in danger?
Opinions:
Majority - Morrison, J.
Yes. The rescue doctrine imposes liability on a negligent actor for injuries sustained by a rescuer, even when the actor’s negligence placed only himself in peril. The court's reasoning is grounded in the principle of foreseeability, famously articulated by Justice Cardozo as 'Danger invites rescue.' It is a foreseeable consequence of placing oneself in danger that another person will attempt a rescue. The negligent actor's duty of ordinary care, as established in Civil Code section 1714, extends to these foreseeable rescuers. The court rejected the rationale of a single outdated case from another jurisdiction, Saylor v. Parsons, and instead aligned with the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which both support liability in first-party rescue scenarios. The court also found a conflicting California appellate decision, Holland v. Crumb, to be unpersuasive and poorly reasoned, as it lacked authority for its conclusion that the rescue doctrine requires a third-party victim.
Analysis:
This decision aligns California law with the vast majority of American jurisdictions by explicitly extending the rescue doctrine to first-party situations. It clarifies that a rescuer's right to recover is an independent right based on the foreseeability of their intervention, not a right derived from the rescued party's potential claims. By rejecting the narrow interpretation found in Holland v. Crumb, the court reinforces the public policy of encouraging rescues and ensures that liability follows negligence, regardless of whether the person endangered is the defendant or a separate third party.
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