Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio
189 L. Ed. 2d 98, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3991 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
When an immigration statute is ambiguous due to internal tension between its clauses, the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) reasonable construction of the statute is entitled to Chevron deference. The BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) to limit 'automatic conversion' and priority date retention to only those aged-out beneficiaries whose petitions can be converted without needing a new sponsor is a permissible construction.
Facts:
- U.S. citizens filed family-preference visa petitions (in the F3 and F4 categories) for their adult children or siblings, who were designated as the 'principal beneficiaries.'
- The minor children of these principal beneficiaries were included on the petitions as 'derivative beneficiaries.'
- The petitioners (sponsors) were the grandparents, aunts, or uncles of these derivative beneficiary children.
- Due to extensive visa backlogs, many years passed between the filing of the petitions and the availability of visas.
- By the time visas became available for the principal beneficiaries, their derivative children had turned 21, thereby 'aging out' and losing their eligibility to immigrate with their parents.
- The principal beneficiaries immigrated, became Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and then filed new F2B petitions for their now-adult children.
- The LPR parents argued that these new petitions for their children should receive the original, earlier 'priority date' from the petitions filed by the grandparents or aunts/uncles.
Procedural Posture:
- Principal beneficiaries, now LPRs, sued the government in U.S. District Court after U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) refused to grant their aged-out children the original, earlier priority dates.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government, deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) restrictive interpretation of the statute in a prior case.
- The plaintiffs (appellees) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- Initially, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling.
- The Ninth Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc and, in a 6-5 decision, reversed the panel, holding that the statute unambiguously granted relief to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries.
- The Government (petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) of the Child Status Protection Act require immigration officials to grant automatic conversion and priority date retention to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries, including those who require a new sponsor to qualify for a new visa category?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Kagan
No, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) does not require relief for all aged-out derivative beneficiaries. The provision is ambiguous because its two clauses are in tension: the first clause broadly describes all aged-out beneficiaries, suggesting sweeping relief, but the second clause provides a remedy ('automatic conversion') that can only apply to a narrow subset of beneficiaries whose petitions can be converted without needing a new sponsor. This internal conflict creates ambiguity, which requires the Court to defer to the BIA's reasonable interpretation under the Chevron doctrine. The BIA's choice to limit the remedy to the group for whom it is mechanically possible is a permissible construction, consistent with the historical meaning of 'automatic conversion' in immigration law and the structural requirement that every visa has a qualified sponsor.
Concurring in the judgment - Chief Justice Roberts
No, the statute does not require relief for all aged-out beneficiaries. The statute is not internally conflicted; rather, its first clause merely defines the universe of individuals potentially affected, while the second, operative clause provides a specific and limited remedy. That remedy, 'automatic conversion,' is not possible for every beneficiary who meets the condition in the first clause. Since Congress did not speak clearly as to the precise scope of 'automatic conversion,' the statute is ambiguous in that respect, and the BIA's reasonable interpretation—that it applies only to petitions not requiring a new sponsor—is entitled to Chevron deference.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes, the statute mandates relief. The central question is whether an 'appropriate category' exists for conversion. Once the parents became Lawful Permanent Residents, their children qualified for the F2B category, creating an 'appropriate category.' At that point, the statute's clear command that the petition 'shall automatically be converted' took effect, and the BIA was not free to disregard this mandate.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, the statute unambiguously requires relief for all aged-out derivative beneficiaries across all five family-preference categories. The statute’s initial 'eligibility clause' clearly applies to all such beneficiaries. The statute provides two independent forms of relief: 'automatic conversion' AND 'retention of the original priority date.' Even if conversion is not possible for some, they are still entitled to retain their priority date. Furthermore, 'automatic conversion' is possible for all categories if interpreted harmoniously, as conversion can occur once the parent becomes an LPR and an 'appropriate category' exists.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the scope of Chevron deference, particularly within the complex framework of immigration law. It establishes that an agency's interpretation can be deemed reasonable even when it resolves a 'Janus-faced' or internally conflicted statute by limiting a broad conditional grant of eligibility to a narrower, mechanically-defined remedy. The fractured opinions highlight a key debate on the Court regarding what constitutes statutory ambiguity: the plurality found it in the conflict between clauses, while the concurrence found it in the undefined scope of the operative term 'automatic conversion.' The ruling narrows the relief available under the Child Status Protection Act, impacting thousands of families separated by visa backlogs.
