Yes, it was unfair. New Mexico's decision violated Schware's constitutional rights. The court said you have to judge a person on who they are *now*, not who they were 20 years ago. Using fake names to get a job when facing prejudice isn't evil. Getting arrested doesn't mean you're a criminal, especially when you were never even charged. And joining a political party that was legal at the time doesn't make you a bad person forever. There was no good reason to think he would be a dishonest lawyer today.

Yes, I agree with the result. States can decide who gets to be a lawyer, but they can't be totally unreasonable. New Mexico's big mistake was automatically assuming that anyone who was a Communist in the 1930s must be a 'questionable character' now. That's just not a fair or logical conclusion, so their decision was wrong and against the Constitution.

Yes, it was unfair to deny Schware a law license because his past actions, which happened a long time ago and didn't result in any guilty verdicts, do not prove he has bad character now. The reasons given by New Mexico do not logically connect to whether Schware would be a good lawyer today. The Supreme Court said that while states can have high standards for lawyers, the standards must make sense in deciding if someone will be a good lawyer.

I agree it was unfair, but for a slightly different reason. I think the biggest problem is that New Mexico put too much importance on Schware being a Communist many years ago. Lots of people were interested in communism during the Great Depression but later changed their minds. This doesn't automatically make them bad people or unfit to be lawyers. Since New Mexico relied too much on this in deciding against Schware, they were unfair to him, even if they considered other parts of his past too.

A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law

A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as "moral character

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards …

The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense

The First Circuit recently held that a lone arrest is not evidence that the person arrested actually committed any criminal conduct, but was equivocal on the permissibility of drawing an inference about character from a longer record: "Although a series of past arrests might legitimately suggest a pattern of unlawful behavior even in the absence of any convictions,[the …

More recently, the Supreme Court stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment."

This may be inconsistent with other decisions which have held that the grounds for admission to an occupation must bear some rational connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice that profession.

An applicant named Rudolph Schware was denied admission in New Mexico and this Court reversed, with five Justices agreeing on one opinion, three Justices on another opinion, and one not participating.

Yes. A state's denial of an opportunity to qualify for the practice of law must comply with the Due Process Clause, meaning any qualification standard must have a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice. Here, the grounds for denial are insufficient. Schware's use of aliases decades ago was to combat anti-Semitic discrimination, not for fraudulent purposes. His arrests, which never led to charges or convictions, have little to no probative value of misconduct. His membership in the Communist Party, which ended over 15 years prior and was lawful at the time, cannot, by itself, justify an inference of present bad moral character, especially absent any evidence of illegal activity or advocacy for violent overthrow. In light of Schware's forceful showing of good moral character in the intervening years, the state's reliance on these past events is arbitrary and lacks a rational connection to his present fitness, thus violating due process.

Yes. While states have broad authority to determine the moral fitness of bar applicants, and federal courts should not merely substitute their judgment, a denial based on a wholly arbitrary standard or an irrational consideration violates due process. The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision rested on the dogmatic and unwarranted inference that Schware's Communist Party membership from six to seven years up to 1940, in and of itself, made him a 'person of questionable character.' This conclusion is contrary to historical facts, as many idealistic youths were drawn to Communism during the Depression and later renounced it. Because the state court's decision was controlled by this impermissible legal inference, it denied Schware due process of law.

Yes, Rudolph Schware was denied a license to practice law in violation of the Due Process Clause because the evidence presented against him, including the use of aliases, arrests without convictions, and past membership in the Communist Party, did not rationally justify a finding that he was morally unfit to practice law. The State's actions were not based on a rational connection with Schware's fitness or capacity to practice law and were therefore in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that while the State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character, these standards must be rationally connected to the practice of law. Schware's past conduct and affiliations, which occurred many years prior and did not result in any convictions, did not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that he lacked the requisite moral character to practice law in the present.

I agree that Schware was denied due process, but for slightly different reasons. The controlling factor for me is the undue weight the New Mexico Supreme Court placed on Schware's Communist Party membership in the 1930s. To hold that this affiliation, which ended 15 years prior, made him a person of questionable character is an unwarranted and arbitrary inference. Many people were drawn to communism during the Great Depression, only to later realize their error. This alone does not make one unfit to practice law. Since the court relied on this improper factor in denying Schware's application, it violated due process, even if Schware's other past conduct was considered. When a State court's decision in a bar admission case is based on arbitrary or constitutionally inadmissible factors, it is subject to review for compliance with the Due Process Clause.

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico

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