Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc.
808 P.2d 226, 53 Cal. 3d 428, 280 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a California superior court action for personal injury or wrongful death, a plaintiff may not obtain a default judgment against a defendant without first serving that defendant with a statement of damages specifying the amount of special and general damages sought, as required by Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Bill Allen is deaf and uses a certified signal dog.
- Allen and his roommate, plaintiff David Schwab, attempted to rent an apartment at Lincoln Terrace, an apartment complex owned and managed by the defendants.
- Plaintiffs informed the apartment manager about the signal dog, showed her the dog's certification card, and provided her with a book about the legal rights of signal dog owners.
- The manager refused to rent an apartment to the plaintiffs specifically because of the signal dog.
- Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for housing discrimination, claiming mental and emotional distress.
- The complaint's prayer for relief requested damages for mental and emotional distress 'in amounts according to proof,' statutory damages of 'no less than $250,' and punitive damages of $500,000.
- Plaintiffs never served the defendants with a formal 'statement of damages' specifying the amount of general and special damages sought.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Bill Allen and David Schwab sued the defendants (owners of Lincoln Terrace) in superior court for housing discrimination.
- The defendants failed to respond to the complaint, and a default was entered against them.
- Following a prove-up hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment awarding each plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
- The defendants filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment, which the trial court granted, finding plaintiffs failed to serve a statement of damages.
- Plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the order setting aside the judgment to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal, as the intermediate appellate court, reversed the trial court's order but reduced the general damages award to $25,000 per plaintiff, affirming the punitive damages.
- The case was then appealed to the California Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff's failure to serve a defendant with a statement of the specific amount of general and special damages sought, as required by California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11, preclude the entry of a default judgment against that defendant in a personal injury action?
Opinions:
Majority - Broussard, J.
Yes. A plaintiff's failure to serve a statement of damages as required by statute precludes the entry of a default judgment. The fundamental due process principle underlying Code of Civil Procedure § 580 is that a defendant must have notice of the specific relief sought before being subjected to a default judgment. Section 425.11 codifies this for personal injury actions, where the complaint itself cannot state the damage amount. The court held that a defendant is entitled to actual notice of their potential liability to have a 'last clear chance' to respond. The court rejected the argument that filing in superior court provides constructive notice of damages up to the court's jurisdictional minimum, reasoning that a defendant could not know the specific amount of general damages sought when jurisdiction might be based on a large punitive damages claim. The court disapproved of prior appellate decisions, like Morgan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., that had allowed a default judgment up to the jurisdictional minimum without a specific statement of damages.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
No. A plaintiff's failure to serve a statement of damages should not completely preclude recovery in a default; they should be entitled to at least the jurisdictional minimum of the superior court. The majority's holding creates an absurd statutory scheme that benefits defendants who intentionally evade service after a complaint is filed. The dissent argues that the majority misreads the court's own precedent in Greenup v. Rodman and that filing a lawsuit in superior court provides sufficient notice that at least the minimum jurisdictional amount is at stake. The dissent criticizes the statutes (§§ 425.10 and 425.11) as bad policy that creates a dilemma for plaintiffs and an incentive for defendants to default and abscond, making it difficult for plaintiffs to effectuate the personal service of the damages statement required by the majority's holding.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strict notice requirements for default judgments in California personal injury cases, resolving a conflict among the courts of appeal. By explicitly disapproving the 'jurisdictional minimum' theory from the Morgan case, the court eliminated a workaround for plaintiffs who failed to serve a statement of damages. The ruling emphasizes that actual, specific notice of general and special damages is a non-negotiable prerequisite, reinforcing due process protections for defaulting defendants against open-ended liability. This places a clear burden on plaintiffs' attorneys to diligently serve the § 425.11 statement before seeking a default, thereby preventing surprise judgments and ensuring defendants can make an informed decision about whether to contest the action.
