Schurk v. Christensen

Washington Supreme Court
497 P.2d 937, 1972 Wash. LEXIS 615, 80 Wash.2d 652 (1972)

ELI5:

Sections

Rule of Law:

Recovery for mental anguish and distress is denied in cases not involving malice or wrongful intent unless there has been an actual invasion of the plaintiff's person or security, or a direct possibility of such invasion.

Facts:

The Schurks and Christensens were neighbors in Seattle, and Mrs. Schurk needed assistance caring for her children while she worked.
In May 1968, Mrs. Christensen recommended her 15-year-old son, Reed, to Mrs. Schurk, describing him as a 'good and capable' babysitter.
Mrs. Christensen knew Reed had a long history of sexually molesting young girls, including his own sister, but she did not disclose this information to the Schurks.
Based on this recommendation, the Schurks hired Reed to babysit their children.
Between May and September 1968, Reed sexually molested the Schurks' 5-year-old daughter, Maria, multiple times.
Mrs. Schurk was not present during these acts and did not discover them until late September 1968, when the Christensens' daughter mentioned the occurrences.
Upon learning of the molestations, Mrs. Schurk suffered severe emotional distress requiring hospitalization and psychiatric care.

Procedural Posture:

The Schurks filed a lawsuit in the state trial court against the Christensen parents and their son, seeking damages for mental anguish, medical expenses, and loss of wages.
The Christensen parents filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims made by the Schurk parents individually.
The trial court granted the summary judgment motion, dismissing the Schurk parents' claims against the Christensen parents.
The Schurks appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Washington.

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Issue:

Does the law permit parents to recover damages for mental anguish and emotional distress caused by the negligence of neighbors who recommended a known child molester as a babysitter, when the parents were not present during the molestations and only learned of them later?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Hunter

No, parents cannot recover for mental distress under these circumstances because they were outside the zone of physical danger. The court adhered to the established rule that recovery for mental anguish without malice or wrongful intent is limited to instances where the plaintiff suffers an actual invasion of their person or security, or a direct possibility thereof. The court distinguished the California case Dillon v. Legg, noting that in Dillon, the mother was near the scene and witnessed the accident. Here, Mrs. Schurk was not near the scene, did not witness the injuries occurring, and learned of the events later from a third person. The court cited policy considerations, specifically the fear of fraudulent claims and unlimited liability, as reasons to maintain the restrictive rule. However, the court did hold that the parents could recover for economic losses, such as medical expenses and lost wages, incurred for the child's care.

Dissenting - Justice Finley

Yes, the parents should be allowed to recover because the defendants breached a direct duty owed to them. The dissent argued that the traditional "zone of danger" rule is outmoded and inapplicable here because this was not a typical accident case. Instead, the Christensen parents committed a tort of negligent misrepresentation directly against the Schurk parents by recommending a known molester. The dissent contended that since the duty was owed directly to the parents (to provide a safe recommendation), and the emotional harm was a foreseeable result of breaching that duty, recovery should be permitted regardless of the parents' physical proximity to the molestations.

Analysis:

This case highlights the judiciary's traditional reluctance to expand tort liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) due to policy concerns regarding "floodgates of litigation" and fraudulent claims. By strictly applying the "zone of danger" test, the Washington Supreme Court refused to extend the principles of bystander liability found in Dillon v. Legg to situations where the plaintiff learns of the injury after the fact. The decision reinforces a bright-line rule requiring contemporaneous sensory observation or physical risk to the plaintiff, even in cases involving egregious negligence like the recommendation of a known sex offender. It sharply contrasts the majority's focus on physical proximity with the dissent's focus on the direct duty of care and foreseeable harm inherent in the misrepresentation.

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