Yes. Northwestern gets to be first in line because it won the 'race to the courthouse.' The law in North Carolina says the only thing that matters is who files their paperwork correctly first. Because the plaintiffs filed their paperwork before their grantor (Roger Baker, Inc.) even owned the property, it was 'outside the chain of title,' which is like putting a file in the wrong cabinet where no one would ever look for it. The court said this makes it an improper filing that doesn't count. Even if Northwestern actually knew about the plaintiffs' earlier loan, it doesn't matter because knowing something isn't a substitute for properly filing the paperwork.

Yes, Northwestern is the true owner because it registered its claim first. The other side's claim wasn't in the official record of ownership for the property, so legally, Northwestern didn't know about it. Even if Northwestern actually knew about the other claim, that doesn't matter. If a claim isn't registered properly, it's like it doesn't exist. So Northwestern doesn't have to accept the other claim. The law is set up this way so that people can trust the official property records to know who owns what. Making people look for claims outside the official records every time would make things confusing, which goes against what the law wants.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b346-9">
 JOHNSON, Judge.
 </author>

 The trial judge certified that there was no just reason for delay in entering judgment for Northwestern. Therefore, this appeal is properly before this Court. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b).
 

 Although the facts outlined above appear complicated, the resolution of the controversy on this appeal depends quite simply
 
 *315
 
 on the application of our recording statute for deeds of trust, G.S. 47-20. This statute is virtually identical to the statute governing outright conveyances, G.S. 47-18, and the two are construed alike.
 
 Francis v. Herren,
 
 101 N.C. 497, 8 S.E. 353 (1888). These statutes provide in essence that the party winning “the race to the court house” will have priority in title disputes.
 
 See
 
 J. Webster, Real Estate Law in North Carolina § 331 (1971).
 

 It is evident in the present case that Northwestern “won the race” to the court house and has priority under the statute. Roger Baker, Inc., plaintiffs’ grantor, did not acquire and register its title until one month after the execution of the deed of trust to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not argue that recordation of the earlier grant to Baker individually constituted substantial compliance with the statute, nor does such an argument appear to have support in the case law.
 
 See McKnight v. M. &amp; J. Finance Corp.,
 
 247 F. 2d 112 (4th Cir. 1957) (chattel mortgage in the name of corporate president insufficient against corporation). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ deed of trust lay outside of Roger Baker, Inc.’s chain of title. Northwestern, in examining title for purposes of its agreement with the successor Roger Baker &amp; Associates, Inc., was not required to search outside its line of title.
 
 See Morehead v. Harris,
 
 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E. 2d 174 (1964) (focusing solely on links in title chain);
 
 Hege v. Sellers,
 
 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E. 2d 892 (1954) (covenant not in direct line of title ineffective);
 
 Maddox v. Arp,
 
 114 N.C. 585, 19 S.E. 665 (1894) (purchaser need only follow “up the stream of title”). Therefore, Northwestern had no notice of plaintiffs’ deed under the law and should prevail.
 

 Our inquiry would ordinarily end there. However, plaintiffs assert that since Northwestern had actual notice of the prior deed of trust, the doctrine of estoppel by deed operates to estop it from denying plaintiffs’ earlier deed. In
 
 Door Co. v. Joyner,
 
 182 N.C. 518, 109 S.E. 259 (1921), our Supreme Court, while recognizing the doctrine of estoppel by deed, held that a subsequent purchaser with neither actual nor constructive notice had superior title by virtue of his prior registration. The Court, plaintiffs argue, left unanswered the question of whether actual notice to the subsequent purchaser would defeat the statutory priority. They accordingly urge the application of estoppel by deed as grounds for reversal.
 

 
 *316
 
 We note first that the leading commentator interprets
 
 Door Co. v. Joyner
 
 otherwise.
 
 See
 
 Webster,
 
 supra,
 
 § 341 at 427. We agree, believing that Webster’s interpretation, that even actual notice of a prior deed will not defeat prior registry, better expresses the policies embodied in the law. Therefore, plaintiffs’ argument must fail.
 

 Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that no notice, however fulf or formal, will supply the want of registration of a deed.
 
 Bourne v. Lay &amp; Co.,
 
 264 N.C. 33, 140 S.E. 2d 769 (1965);
 
 Dulin v.
 
 Williams, 239 N.C. 33, 79 S.E. 2d 213 (1953). These cases, read (1) with those cases limiting the duty to search to the chain of title,
 
 see Morehead v. Harris, supra,
 
 (2) with those cases making registration of deeds defective as to material particulars ineffective,
 
 see McClure v. Crow,
 
 196 N.C. 657, 146 S.E. 713 (1929), and (3) with the statutory recording and indexing requirements,
 
 see
 
 G.S. 47-20.1 (same county); G.S. 161-14.2
 
 et seq.,
 
 clearly indicate that registration outside the chain of title has the same effect on notice as no registration. Plaintiffs, although they apparently alleged fraudulent conduct by Northwestern in their complaint, forecast no such evidence nor do they argue any fraud on Northwestern’s part before this Court. Therefore, any actual notice to Northwestern is insufficient to supply the want of proper registration.
 

 We are aware that our Supreme Court has recently stated that “Our registration statute does not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value.”
 
 Hill v. Memorial Park,
 
 304 N.C. 159, 165, 282 S.E. 2d 779, 783 (1981). However, this statement in
 
 Hill
 
 referred to situations in which a separate official notice of litigation had been served on the purchasers or notice of
 
 lis pendens
 
 had been filed. The cases cited in
 
 Hill
 
 to support the quoted statement both involved
 
 lis pendens
 
 notice.
 
 See Lawing v. Jaynes,
 
 285 N.C. 418, 206 S.E. 2d 162 (1974);
 
 Whitehurst v. Abbott,
 
 225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E. 2d 129 (1945). The means of constructive or actual notice discussed in
 
 Hill
 
 are statutorily mandated, formal means of notice of litigation; we do not read them to extend to other less formal means of notice. Therefore, we hold that Northwestern is not estopped to deny plaintiffs’ title.
 

 The policy behind the recording statutes supports our conclusion. The General Assembly, by enacting these laws, clearly in
 
 *317
 
 tended that prospective purchasers should be able to safely rely on the public records.
 
 See Hayes v. Ricard,
 
 245 N.C. 687, 97 S.E. 2d 105 (1957);
 
 Clark v. Butts,
 
 240 N.C. 709, 83 S.E. 2d 885 (1954). To adopt plaintiffs’ position would require prospective purchasers to search outside the chain of title in every case, and thus inject a new element of uncertainty into the process, contrary to this longstanding policy. We note also the recent adoption of G.S. 47-20.5, which requires that after-acquired property clauses in security agreements be extended or re-recorded after each subsequent purchase of real property. This indicates a legislative insistence that due recordation
 
 in the chain of title
 
 must remain the only effective means of protecting title.
 

 Accordingly, we conclude that Northwestern has shown a complete defense as a matter of law. The summary judgment in its favor was properly granted and must be
 

 Affirmed.
 
<judges id="b349-8">
 Judges Wells and Becton concur.
 </judges>
</opinion>

No. A subsequent purchaser's actual notice of a prior deed of trust recorded outside the chain of title does not defeat the priority gained by being the first to properly record. North Carolina's recording statute, G.S. 47-20, is a pure 'race' statute, meaning the first party to properly record their interest at the courthouse wins the priority dispute. Because the plaintiffs recorded their deed of trust before their grantor, Roger Baker, Inc., had acquired title, their deed was outside the chain of title. A subsequent purchaser like Northwestern has no legal duty to search outside the direct chain of title and therefore had no constructive notice of the plaintiffs' interest. The court explicitly holds that under a race statute, no amount of actual notice, however 'full or formal,' can substitute for the legal requirement of proper registration. The policy behind this strict rule is to ensure that prospective purchasers can rely with certainty on the public records.

Yes. Northwestern has priority because it 'won the race' to the courthouse and registered its deed of trust first. The plaintiffs' deed of trust lay outside of Roger Baker, Inc.'s chain of title, and Northwestern had no constructive notice of plaintiffs' deed under the law. Actual notice of a prior deed will not defeat the statutory priority gained by prior registry. Registration outside the chain of title has the same effect on notice as no registration. Therefore, any actual notice to Northwestern is insufficient to supply the want of proper registration, and Northwestern is not estopped to deny plaintiffs' title. The policy behind the recording statutes clearly intends that prospective purchasers should be able to safely rely on the public records. To require searching outside the chain of title in every case would inject uncertainty contrary to this longstanding policy.

Schuman v. Roger Baker & Associates, Inc.

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