Schultz v. Ford Motor Co.

Majority - Sullivan, Justice

Yes, Indiana Evidence Rule 301 permits a trial court to instruct a jury on such a statutory rebuttable presumption, even when contrary evidence has been introduced and despite the instruction's use of the term "presume." The Indiana Supreme Court held that the second sentence of Indiana Evidence Rule 301, which states, "A presumption shall have continuing effect even though contrary evidence is received," directly modified prior Indiana law and rejected the pure "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions (Thayer's approach). The Court found that this addition was intended to ensure that the policies underlying presumptions are effectuated by juries. Thus, a trial court properly gives "continuing effect" to a presumption by instructing the jury that it may infer the existence of a presumed fact when a basic fact is proven. This interpretation applies to the statutory presumption in Indiana Code section 34-20-5-1, which provides a rebuttable presumption that a product complying with applicable federal standards is not defective or negligent. The Court acknowledged that commentators generally advise against using the word "presumption" in jury instructions due to potential misunderstanding. However, it found that the instruction's use of "presume" and "presumption" in this case was not a legal or technical usage but rather synonymous with "infer" or "assume." Furthermore, the instruction was deemed balanced because it also informed the jury that the plaintiffs could rebut this presumption by introducing evidence that the product was defective. The Court also rejected the Schultzes' argument that the instruction violated the Supremacy Clause through the Federal Safety Act's saving and preemption clauses, reasoning that the Indiana statute merely assigns value to compliance with federal standards as a matter of state law, rather than creating a federal defense or imposing new vehicle safety standards.