Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections v. Summerlin
542 U.S. 348 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A new rule of criminal procedure, such as the one established in Ring v. Arizona requiring a jury to find aggravating factors for a death sentence, does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review unless it is a "watershed" rule that is both implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and essential to the accuracy of the proceeding, a standard Ring does not meet.
Facts:
- In April 1981, Brenna Bailey, a Finance America employee, disappeared after a house call to discuss a debt with Warren Summerlin’s wife.
- That same evening, an anonymous caller, later identified as Summerlin’s mother-in-law, accused Summerlin of murdering Bailey.
- The next morning, Bailey's body was discovered in the trunk of her car with a crushed skull, wrapped in a bedspread from Summerlin's home.
- Police arrested Summerlin and later overheard him make incriminating statements to his wife.
- Under the Arizona capital sentencing law in effect at the time, a trial judge, rather than a jury, was responsible for finding the existence of enumerated aggravating factors necessary to impose a death sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- Warren Summerlin was convicted of first-degree murder and sexual assault in an Arizona state trial court.
- Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge found two statutory aggravating factors and sentenced Summerlin to death.
- The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Summerlin's conviction and sentence on direct review, making his case final.
- Summerlin then pursued state and federal habeas corpus relief.
- While his federal habeas petition was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.
- The en banc Ninth Circuit invalidated Summerlin's death sentence, holding that the rule in Ring applied retroactively to his case.
- The State of Arizona, represented by Director of Corrections Dora Schriro, appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the rule established in Ring v. Arizona, which requires that a jury, not a judge, find the aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty, apply retroactively to cases that were already final on direct review?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. The rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. New substantive rules apply retroactively, but procedural rules do not unless they fall into a narrow exception for 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' that implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding. Ring's rule is procedural because it does not alter the range of conduct punishable by death but only regulates the manner of determining the defendant's culpability by allocating decision-making authority from a judge to a jury. This rule is not a 'watershed' rule because it does not seriously diminish the accuracy of the proceeding. The Court reasoned that the evidence is 'too equivocal' to conclude that jury factfinding is so fundamentally more accurate than judicial factfinding as to create an 'impermissibly large risk' of an unjust sentence. Citing DeStefano v. Woods, which denied retroactive application to the right to a jury trial itself, the Court concluded that if a trial conducted entirely by a judge is not impermissibly inaccurate for retroactivity purposes, then a sentencing proceeding where a judge finds only the aggravating factors cannot be either.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The holding in Ring v. Arizona amounts to a 'watershed' procedural ruling that should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Ring rule meets the two-part test for watershed rules from Teague v. Lane because it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and is 'central to an accurate determination' that death is the appropriate punishment. Juries are more likely than judges to accurately express community values when determining aggravating factors, such as whether a crime was 'especially heinous, cruel, or depraved.' Furthermore, the fundamental principles underlying Teague, especially the heightened need for accuracy in capital cases where 'death is different,' strongly favor retroactivity. The state's interests in finality and resource conservation are weaker in this context, and the spectacle of executing a person sentenced under a procedure now known to be unconstitutional, while sparing another due to timing, undermines public confidence in the justice system. The majority's reliance on DeStefano is misplaced because that case involved different circumstances and a much greater administrative burden.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the principle of finality in criminal law and narrows the availability of federal habeas corpus relief for prisoners whose convictions became final before a new, favorable procedural rule was announced. By classifying the Ring rule as procedural and not 'watershed,' the Court reaffirmed the exceptionally high bar for retroactive application under Teague v. Lane. This holding signals that very few, if any, new procedural rules will qualify for retroactivity, emphasizing that finality will generally outweigh the goal of applying new constitutional interpretations uniformly to all prisoners. The decision effectively limits the impact of Ring to defendants whose cases were still on direct review when it was decided.
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